Determination of contract by employer in construction industry by Tay, Lee Yong
  
i 
 
 
 
 
 
DETERMINATION OF CONTRACT BY EMPLOYER IN CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
 
TAY LEE YONG 
 
 
 
 
A project report submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirement for the award of the degree of 
Master of Science (Construction Contract Management) 
 
 
 
 
 
Faculty of Built Environment 
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
JULY 2006 
  
PSZ 19:16 (Pind. 1/97) 
UNIVERSITI TEKNOLOGI MALAYSIA 
BORANG PENGESAHAN STATUS TESIS♦
 
 
JUDUL :    DETERMINATION OF CONTRACT BY EMPLOYER IN 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
 
SESI PENGAJIAN : 2005/2006 
 
TAY LEE YONG 
Saya         
             (HURUF BESAR) 
 
Mengaku membenarkan tesis (PSM/ Sarjana/ Doktor Falsafah)* ini disimpan di Perpustakaan 
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia dengan syarat-syarat kegunaan seperti berikut: 
 
1. Tesis adalah hakmilik Universiti Teknologi Malaysia 
2. Perpustakaan Universiti Teknologi Malaysia dibenarkan membuat salinan untuk  
tujuan pengajian sahaja. 
3. Perpustakaan dibenarkan membuat salinan tesis ini sebagai bahan pertukaran  
antara institusi tinggi. 
4. ** Sila tandakan (√ ) 
 
 
  SULIT   (Mengandungi maklumat yang berdarjah keselamatan       
                                                                 atau kepentingan Malaysia seperti yang termaktub di  
                                                                 dalam AKTA RAHSIA RASMI 1972) 
 
  TERHAD  (Mengandungi maklumat TERHAD yang telah     
                                                                 ditentukan oleh organisasi/badan di mana penyelidikan   
                                                                 dijalankan) 
 
 TIDAK TERHAD 
         
                                                                                                   Disahkan oleh 
 
_______________________________  ____________________________ 
           (TANDATANGAN PENULIS)      (TANDATANGAN PENYELIA) 
 
Alamat Tetap :  
No.14, Jalan Kurau 12,         
Taman Sungai Abong,                     ASSOC. PROF. DR. MAIZON HASHIM 
84000 Muar, Johor.                      Nama Penyelia 
 
Tarikh :     14th July 2006        Tarikh : __14th July 2006   _______ 
 
CATATAN: * Potong yang tidak berkenaan 
** Jika tesis ini SULIT atau TERHAD, sila lampirkan surat daripada pihak 
berkuasa/ organisasi berkenaan dengan menyatakan sekali sebab dan tempoh 
tesis ini perlu dikelaskan sebagai SULIT atau TERHAD. 
♦ Tesis dimaksudkan sebagai tesis bagi Ijazah Doktor Falsafah dan Sarjana 
secara penyelidikan, atau disertai bagi pengajian secara kerja kursus dan 
penyelidikan, atau Laporan Projek Sarjana Muda (PSM). 
 
√ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“We hereby declare that we have read this project report and in our opinion this 
project report is sufficient in terms of scope and quality for the award of the degree 
of Master of Science (Construction Contract Management).” 
 
 
 
 
Signature  :  
Name of Supervisor I :     ASSOC. PROF. DR. MAIZON HASHIM 
Date   : 14.07.2006 
 
 
 
Signature  :  
Name of Supervisor II :     EN. NORAZAM OTHMAN 
Date   : 14.07.2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ii 
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I declare that this project report entitled “Determination of Contract By Employer in 
Construction Industry ” is the result of my own research except as cited in the references. 
The report has not been accepted for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in 
candidature of any other degree. 
 
 
 
Signature :   
Name : TAY LEE YONG  
Date : 14th JULY 2006  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
To my beloved Father and Mother, 
Sister and Brother, 
And Wilson. 
 
Thank you for your support, guidance and everything. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 This master project can be completed successfully due to the contribution of many 
people. First of all, I would like to express my highest gratitude to my supervisor, Assoc. 
Prof. Dr. Maizon Hashim for her patience, guidance, advice and support in order to 
complete this master project. 
  
 
 Next, I would like to thank all the lecturers for the course of Master of Science 
(Construction Contract Management), for their patience and kind advice during the 
process of completing the master project. 
 
  
 Besides that, I am deeply grateful to my family for their unconditional love and 
care through out the years.  Unforgettable, I would like to thank Wilson who has given 
me full support during this study.   
 
 
 Finally, I want to extend my grateful appreciation to all the seniors, juniors and 
my lovely classmates who have given me morale support to complete this project report.   
 
 
 
  
v 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
In the construction industry, the standard form of building contract is one of the 
key methods of ameliorating a potentially fractious relationship to achieve a common end. 
All standard forms of construction contract contain clauses for determination of contracts. 
There is a distinction between “determination” and “termination”. Briefly, termination of 
a contract takes place at a point in time in the course of a contract period when a legally 
binding contract is brought to an end before it has been discharged by performance due to 
the acts of one or both parties. Under standard form of construction contract, there are 
several clauses provided for determination of contract by the employer and the 
determination of contract by contractor. Under both PWD 203A and PAM 1998 standard 
forms of contract, it has provided several conditions which allow the employer to 
determinate the contract of the employment. Under both contracts, there are several 
default by the contractor which will caused the employer to determine their employment, 
such as suspension of works by contractor; failure to proceed regularly and diligently; 
failure to remove defective works; assignment or sub-letting without consent; failure to 
execute works in accordance with the contract and bankruptcy, insolvency, etc of the 
contractor. Therefore, the employer may determine the contract pursuant the defaults of 
the contractor. Normally, some of the contractors are unfamiliar with the clauses 
provided under the contract. Therefore, by investigating the most frequent reasons for 
determination by employer according to the standard form of contract, it will be able to 
create awareness among the contractors. So, the contractors can prevent from being 
determined by the employer. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
 
 
Dalam industri pembinaan, borang kontrak standard merupakan salah satu cara 
untuk mengurangkan hubungan tegang dan mencapai satu penamatan yang mutlak. 
Semua borang kontrak standard mengandungi klausa penamatan kontrak. Terdapat 
perbezaan antara perkataan “determination” dan “termination”. Secara umumnya, 
penamatan sesebuah kontrak merupakan satu kontrak yang jilid mencapai satu hujung 
penamatan sebelum kontrak tersebut dilepaskan secara kesempurnaan kerja yang 
dilakukan oleh satu atau kedua-dua pihak. Dalam borang kontrak standard, terdapat 
beberapa klausa bagi penamatan kontrack oleh majikan dan penamatan kontrak oleh 
kontraktor. Dalam kedua-dua JKR 203A dan PAM 1998 borang kontrak standard, 
terdapat beberapa keadaan yang dibekalkan untuk membolehkan majikan menamatkan 
kontrak tersebut. Kesilapan kontraktor yang dibekalkan dalam kedua-dua kontrak 
tersebut adalah seperti menggantung perjalanan kerja tanpa sebab yang munasabah, gagal 
meneruskan kerja mengikut aturan dan tekunnya, gagal menukar atau mengganti kerja 
yang cacat, sub-sewa kerja tanpa pengetahuan majikan dan kebankrapan atau 
ketaksolvenan kontraktor. Oleh itu, majikan boleh menamatkan kontrak tersebut 
mengikut kemungkiran yang dilakukan oleh kontraktor. Biasanya, sesetengah kontraktor 
kurang biasa dengan klausa dalam kontrak. Oleh yang demikian, dengan mengkaji sebab 
yang paling kerap menyebabkan penamatan kontrak oleh majikan mengikut borang 
kontrak standard, ini akan meningkatkan kesedaran kontraktor. Dengan ini, kontraktor 
boleh mengelakkan supaya kontrak tidak ditamatkan oleh majikan mereka. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1  Background Study 
 
 
Construction in Malaysia spans a wide spectrum of activities stretching from 
simple renovation works for private homes to massive construction projects. Every such 
building activity may create its own unique set of requirements and circumstance. The 
different sectors including employer groups, contractors, suppliers, manufacturers, 
professionals have their own interests which are very often divergent and competing in 
nature.1  
 
 
The standard form of building contract is one of the key methods of ameliorating 
a potentially fractious relationship to achieve a common end. It evidences the legal 
relationship between the parties in contract and provides the administrative procedures 
                                                 
1
 Sundra Rajoo. (1999). The Malaysian Standard Form of Building Contract (the PAM 1998 Form). 2nd 
Edition, Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd. Pg 3 
  
2 
 
necessary for the realization of the legal relationship. Any standard form of contract 
would need to appreciate and incorporate all the special requirements and circumstances 
that a project would call for. A standard form of building contract would therefore be 
useful in expressing the obligation of the parties and setting out the reasonable clarity the 
scope of the project.2 
 
 
 In Malaysia, there are several types of Standard Form of Contract available to use 
in construction, such as PWD 203A, PAM, CIDB, IEM and etc. The PWD forms of 
contract are the de facto standard forms of contraction contract used by the Malaysian 
public sector. In fact, this has been in recent years increasing usage of the PWD forms 
with amendments by the private sector as well, especially in civil engineering 
construction.3 However, the PAM standard form of building contract was very widely 
used in the private sector. 
 
 
All standard forms of construction contract contain clauses for determination of 
contracts. There is a distinction between “determination” and “termination”. The 
common law right to terminate or ‘repudiate’ a contract can arise in either of two 
situations. First, one party may make clear that it has no intention of performing its side 
of the bargain. Secondly, that party may be guilty of such a serious breach of contract that 
it will be treated as having no intention of performing. A breach of this kind is known as 
a ‘repudiatory breach’. In both cases, the innocent party has a choice; either to ‘affirm’ 
the contract and hold the other party to its obligations (while claiming damages as 
appropriate for the breach), or to bring the contract to an end. If repudiation is opted for, 
then both parties are released from any further contractual obligation to perform.4  
 
 
                                                 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Lim Chong Fong. (2004). The Malaysian PWD Form of Construction Contract. Thomson Asia Pte Ltd. 
Pg 1 
4
 Murdoch, J and Hughes, W. (1997). Construction Contracts: Law and Management. E & FN Spon. 
London. Pg 324 
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By contrast, many building contracts make provision for ‘determination of the 
contractor’s employment’ in specified circumstances. Not all of these circumstances 
amount to sufficiently serious breaches of contract to justify termination; indeed, some of 
them are not breaches at all. Such ‘determination’ clauses normally lay down procedure 
(giving notice etc.), which must be followed if the determination is to be effective. They 
also deal with the consequences, financial and otherwise, of the determination.5  
 
 
According to John Wong, 2005, termination that often termed to be a taboo 
among the players in the construction industry owing to the severity of the consequences 
arising herefrom. Common words such as determination or forfeiture are termed as 
synonymous to termination. Briefly, termination of a contract takes place at a point in 
time in the course of a contract period when a legally binding contract is brought to an 
end before it has been discharged by performance due to the acts of one or both parties.6  
 
 
Under standard form of construction contract, there are several provisions of 
clauses for determination of contract by the employer and the determination of contract 
by contractor. Under PWD 203A, there is only provision for determination by the 
employer. However, the contractor’s right to determine his employment under the 
contract remains enforceable under the common law and the Contract Act 1950. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Murdoch, J and Hughes, W. (1997). Construction Contracts: Law and Management. E & FN Spon. 
London. Pg 324 
6
 John Wong. (2005). Terminated or be Terminated. The Malaysian Surveyor. 39.1. Page 12 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
 
 
There are several types of standard form of contract available in Malaysia, such as 
PWD 203A, PAM (with quantities), CIDB, IEM and etc. In each of the standard form of 
contract, there are clauses provided for the determination of contract. These include the 
determination of contract by employer and determination of contract by contractor. In 
this study, it will focus on the determination of construction contract by the employer 
according to the PWD 203A and PAM standard form of contract.  
 
 
Under both standard forms of contract, it provide several reasons which give the 
employer the right to determinate the contract of the employment. Under clause 51 (a) 
PWD 203A Form, it allows the employer to determinate the contract if there is any 
default by the contractor, such as the contractor without reasonable cause suspends the 
carrying out of the works; the contractor fails to proceed regularly and diligently with the 
works; the contractor fails to execute the works in accordance with the contract; the 
contractor refuses or neglects to comply with a written notice from the SO; or the 
contractor fails to comply with the provisions of clause 27 (a), (b) and (d). Besides that, 
under clause 51 (b), the employer may determinate the contract if the contractor becomes 
bankrupt or insolvent. 
 
 
Besides that, under clause 25.1 of the PAM 1998 form, it provides comprehensive 
grounds for termination provision invoked by the employer. Such grounds comprise the 
default of the contractor such as contractor suspending the works without any reasonable 
cause, the contractor’s failure to proceed regularly and diligently, the contractor’s failure 
to execute the works in accordance with the contract, the contractor’s failure to correct or 
remedy any defective works as instructed, and the contractor’s failure to obtain written 
consent prior to sub-letting the works (John Wong, 2005).  
  
5 
 
 Clause 25.0 under PAM 1998 seeks to improve on the common law rights of the 
parties, sets out the procedure to be followed and the rights and liabilities of the parties 
after the exercise of the power of determination until the final settlement. It is the 
contractor’s employment under the contract which is determined and the parties’ rights 
after a valid determination continue to be governed by the express contractual provisions. 
The contract itself does not come to an end but remains in being, albeit in a modified 
form.7 The effect of determination is to relieve the contractor of his obligation to perform 
further work under the contract or to remove his right to do so, depending upon who is 
exercising the right of determination.8 
 
 
 According to our ex-Minister of Entrepreneur and Co-Operative Development, 
Datuk Seri Mohamed Nazri Aziz, they will black list the contractors who has registered 
under Pusat Khidmat Kontraktor (PKK) and failed to complete the projects. All the 
contractors are given opportunity to complete the project within the certain period. 
Therefore, they will not have second chances for those contractors who have failed to 
carry out their duties to proceed the works. Their failure to complete the works will affect 
the third parties’ benefits. For an example, under the Minister of Entrepreneur and Co-
Operative Development, there are a lot of shop lot projects. Their failure of completing 
the shop lot projects will cause many people cannot start their business on time.9 
 
 
 Besides, due to issues on the cracks which appeared on a fly-over of the Middle 
Ring Road 2 project, the landslide along the North-South Expressway, the air-
conditioning and structural defects of the Sultan Ismail Hospital in Johor Bahru, and the 
design problems of the East Coast Highway, our Works Minister Datuk Seri S. Samy 
Vellu promised to revoke the contracts of those who did not measure up. The PWD 
                                                 
7
 See the Tanzanian case of . 
8
 Sundra Rajoo, ibid, Pg 246 
9
 D J Dolasoh. (2004). Senarai hitam kontraktor gaga., Berita Minggu. 29 February 2004. 
  
6 
 
(Public Works Department) officials also instructed to revoke the contracts of errant 
contractors.10   
 
 
According to the standard form of construction contract, there are several reasons 
listed under the provided clause which allow the employer or the contractor to 
determinate the contract. What are the most frequent reasons that has caused the 
determination of contract by the employer in the actual construction industry? Therefore, 
this study will focus on the most frequent disputes associated with the determination of 
contract by employer in construction projects which are referred to the court. 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Objective 
 
 
The objective of this study is  
 
 To identify the most frequent disputes associated with the determination of contract 
by employer in construction projects which are referred to the court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Hamidah Atan. 2004. Errant Contractors to be Fired. New Straits Times. 18 October 2004 
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1.4 Scope of Study 
 
 
The scope of this study is focused on the reasons for the determination of contract 
by employer according to the standard form of contract. Although the determination of 
contract by contractor is included in the scope of determination of contract in 
construction, this study is not going to discuss on that area. 
 
 
There are several types of standard form of contract used in Malaysia. Therefore, 
for this research, this study will focus on both PWD 203A and PAM 1998 (with 
quantities) Standard Forms of Contract as they are the most common types of contracts 
used in Malaysia.  
 
 
On the other hand, there is no limitation for the court cases referred to in this 
study in terms of type of projects as long as the case is related to the determination of 
contract by employer in construction and it was reported in the Malaysia Law Journal. 
 
 
 
 
1.5 Significance of Study 
 
 
Under the standard form of contract, there are clauses provided for employer to 
determinate the contract according to the reasons as stated. Normally, some of the 
contractors are unfamiliar with the clauses provided under the contract. Therefore, by 
investigating the most frequent reasons for determination by employer according to the 
  
8 
 
standard form of contract, it will be able to create awareness among the contractors. So, 
the contractors can prevent from being determined by the employer. 
 
 
Furthermore, this study also can be used as a basic guidance for those who are 
involved in the construction industry, such as employer, architects, contractor’s 
consultant and etc., in relation to the determination of the contract by employer. Once 
they clearly understand the clauses provided under the contract, the contractor will 
perceive the importance of his rights to complete the works as required to prevent being 
determined by the employer. The contractor’s adviser also can advise the contractor so 
that unnecessary disputes can be avoided and assuring project success and tie-up a better 
relationship among the contractual parties. 
 
 
 There are some previous theses regarding determination of contract. However, 
they focused on the implication of determination of contract towards other parties 
involved in the construction industry (Zainul Asri Haji Che Omar, 1995), and the study of 
the determination of contract by JKR (Che Rozilawani Che Awang, 2003). Hence, for 
this study, the author will focus on the reasons for determination by the employer 
according to the PWD 203A and PAM Standard Form of Contract and the consequences 
of the determination of contract by employer towards the parties involved in the contract.  
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1.6 Research Methodology 
 
 
In order to achieve the research objectives, a systematic process of conducting 
this study had been organised. Basically, this research process consists of five major 
stages, which involve identifying the research issue, literature review, data collection, 
data analysis, conclusion and suggestions. 
 
 
1.6.1 Stage 1: Identifying The Research Issue 
 
 
The research issue arises from the intensive reading of books, journals, articles 
and newspaper cutting which can easily be attained from the UTM library. From the 
research issue, the objectives of the study have been identified. This research is carried 
out to review the most frequent disputes associated with the determination of contract by 
employer in construction which are referred to the court and the consequences of 
determination of contract by employer towards the parties involved in the contract. 
 
 
1.6.2 Stage 2: Literature Review 
 
 
After the research issue and objectives have been identified, various 
documentation and literature review regarding to the research field will be collected to 
achieve the research objectives. Generally, secondary data is collected from the latest 
reading materials in printing form such as books, journals, research papers, reports, 
newspaper as well as from the internet. It is important to identify trends and 
developments over time in construction industry, as well as the general state of 
knowledge concerning the subject area of determination of contract such as background, 
definition, procedures, relevant events and etc. 
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1.6.3 Stage 3: Data Collection 
 
 
After identifying all the background and relevant issues through literature review, 
legal cases based on previous court cases which are related to the research issue will be 
collected from Malayan Law Journals via UTM library electronic database, namely 
Lexis-Nexis Legal Database. The previous court cases which are related to the 
determination of contract by employer in construction will be sorted out from the 
Malayan Law Journals cases.   
 
 
1.6.4 Stage 4: Research Analysis 
 
 
Once the previous related court cases under Malayan Law Journal are collected, 
the author will conduct case study on the related legal cases. The case study is started by 
carefully reviewing and clarifying all the facts of the cases. All of the cases will focus on 
two parts, disputes associated with the determination of contract by employer in 
construction which are referred to the court and the other is the consequences of 
determination of contract by employer towards the parties involved in the contract. After 
the author has focused on the issues presented by each case, discussion and comparison 
would be done. The author will compare and identify the most frequent disputes 
associated with the determination of contract by employer in construction which are 
referred to the court and also the consequences of the determination of contract towards 
the parties involved.  
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1.6.5 Stage 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
In the last stage, the author will review the whole process of the study with the 
intention to identify whether the research objectives have been achieved. After presenting 
the research findings, further research will be suggested.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
 
 
DETERMINATION OF CONTRACT AT COMMON LAW AND 
CONTRACT ACT 1950 
 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
 
 Generally, what is termination? Termination is a word that often termed to be a 
taboo among the players in the construction industry owing to the severity of the 
consequences arising herefrom. Common words such as determination or forfeiture are 
termed as synonymous to termination. Briefly, termination of contract takes place at a 
point in time in the course of the contract period when a legally binding contract period is 
brought to an end before it has been discharged by performance due to the acts of one or 
both parties.11  
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 John Wong. (2005). Terminated or be Terminated. The Malaysian Surveyor. 39.1. Page 12 
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There is a distinction between “determination” and “termination”. According to 
the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, the word ‘determination’ means the quality 
that makes you continue trying to do something even when this is difficult or the process 
of deciding something officially. However, for the word ‘termination’ was explained as 
the act of ending something. 12 
 
 
‘Determination’ of a contract occurs where a valid and enforceable contract is 
brought to an end prematurely either by its becoming impossible of performance by 
circumstances which were unforeseeable at the time the contract was formed or by the 
actions of one or both parties. It is an interesting feature of many standard forms of 
construction contract that their express provisions do not include rights to determine the 
contract itself but merely confer rights to determinate the employment of the contractor 
under it, i.e. to relieve the contractor of his obligation to complete the works which he 
undertook. The contract itself remains in existence and the forms usually spell out in 
detail the rights and obligations of the parties where either of them exercises the express 
power of determination of employment. There is no consistency of terminology in the 
contract forms prepared by various organizations, e.g. the words ‘determine’ and 
‘terminate’ are used synonymously. 13 
 
 
It is important at the outset to understand the distinction between the two concepts 
of “termination for breach” and “determination”, and the legal consequences of that 
distinction. The common law right to terminate or ‘repudiate’ a contract can arise in 
either of two situations. First, one party may make clear that it has no intention of 
performing its side of the bargain. Secondly, that party may be guilty of such a serious 
breach of contract that it will be treated as having no intention of performing. A breach of 
this kind is known as a ‘repudiatory breach’. In both cases, the innocent party has a 
                                                 
12
 Wehmeier, S. [2000]. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English. Sixth Edition. Oxford 
University Press. New York 
13
 Powell-Smith, V and Sims, J. [1987]. Determination and Suspension of Construction Contracts. William 
Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. London. Pg 1 
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choice; either to ‘affirm’ the contract and hold the other party to its obligations (while 
claiming damages as appropriate for the breach), or to bring the contract to an end. If 
repudiation is opted for, then both parties are released from any further contractual 
obligation to perform.14 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Determination at Common Law 
 
 
A contract may be determined before completion at common law or by the 
exercise of express rights set out in the contract itself. In the latter case, the determination 
clause often seeks to improve on the common law rights of the parties by giving grounds 
for determination which would not entitle one party to determine at common law. Most 
determination clauses also specify the rights and obligations of the parties following the 
exercise of the power of determination, and leave the common law rights of the parties 
intact. 15 
 
 
This point is of some significance since, where the ground of determination is not 
one which would be treated as repudiator at common law, it has been held that the party 
determining is entitled only to such remedy as the contract itself specifically provides: 
Thomas Feather & Co. (Bradford) Ltd v Keighley Corporation 16. In that case, a contract 
clause provided, somewhat ungrammatically: 
 
‘Contractor shall not assign or underlet this contract or any part of it or enter into 
a sub-contract except with the consent of the Corporation. Compliance with these 
                                                 
14
 Murdoch, J and Hughes, W. (1997). Construction Contracts: Law and Management. E & FN Spon. 
London. Pg 324 
15
 Powell-Smith, V and Sims, J. [1987]. Ibid. Pg 1 
16
 [1953] 53 Local Government Reports 30 
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conditions is of the essence of this contract and in the event of non-compliance by 
Contractor it shall be lawful for the Corporation to adopt either of following 
remedies: 
(i) The Corporation may absolutely determine the contract, or 
(ii) The Corporation may call on Contractor in respect of such non-
compliance for the sum of £ 100 by way of liquidated and ascertained 
damages and not by way of penalty.’ 
 
 
The contractor did sub-contract in breach of this provision and the corporation 
determined the contract. The work was completed by another contractor and the 
corporation claimed the extra cost of £ 21,000 as damages for breach of contract. The 
high court held that they were not so entitled. Lord Goddard CJ said that the contract 
clause conferred a specific right on the corporation.  
 
‘… that is that they can put an end to the contract once and for all. I would have 
expected to find, if it was intended that, in those circumstances, the contractor 
would be liable for damages, that there would have been an express provision put 
in to that effect. I think that this provision simply gives the Corporation a right to 
terminate the contract, which they would not otherwise have had, and that it gives 
them nothing more’. 17 
 
 
 Under common law, there are several ways to discharge the contract. There are 
discharged by frustration, discharged by repudiation and discharged by breach. 
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2.2.1 Discharged by Frustration  
 
 
Most legal systems make provision for the discharge of a contract where, 
subsequent to its formation, a change of circumstances renders the contract legally or 
physically impossible of performance. In English law, such a situation is provided for by 
the doctrine of Frustration. Originally, this term was confined to be discharged of 
maritime contracts by the ‘frustration of the adventure’, but it has now been extended to 
cover all cases where an agreement has been terminated by supervening events beyond 
the control of either party. This development is no mere linguistic accident, for it is not 
strictly necessary that performance should have become literally impossible, provided 
that it cannot be properly demanded in the fundamentally different situation which has 
unexpected occurred.18 
 
 
 Frustration is sometimes referred to as supervening impossibility of performance. 
The essence of the doctrine is that both parties are excused from further performance of 
their obligations and neither is liable to the other for any damage resulting. The contract 
is brought to an end by events which make performance of the contract fundamentally 
different from that contemplated at the time the contract was made.19 
 
 
 Besides that, a legal doctrine, known as ‘frustration of contract’ applies where, 
due to some external event, performance of a contract becomes impossible, illegal or 
radically different from what was originally envisaged. If this happens through the fault 
of neither party, and the contract itself makes no sufficient provision for what was 
occurred, it is possible that the law may treat the contract as terminated. In such a case 
both parties are freed from any further obligations under the contract. As for any losses 
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 Guest, A G [1975], “Anson’s Law of Contract”, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Pg 476 
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 Powell-Smith, V and Sims, J. [1987]. Ibid. Pg 3 
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already incurred, these will be allocated between the parties in accordance with principles 
in the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.20 
  
 
 It is important to appreciate that this doctrine is very limited in its application. If 
the general law terminates a contract in this way, it interferes with the balance of the risks 
between the parties. In the building and civil engineering fields in particular, the courts 
recognize that the kind of risks involved in such cases often fall naturally on one party or 
the other, and that to give the risk-bearing party an escape route would unfairly distort 
this balance. What is more, most standard-form contracts make express provision for 
many of the eventualities that might lead a party to claim that a contract has been 
frustrated, and the doctrine cannot be used to override clear contract terms.21 
 
 
 Two decision of the House of Lords may be used to illustrated the doctrine of 
frustration and given an idea of its limits. In the first of these, Davis Contractors Ltd v 
Fareham Urban District Council 22, which is the leading English case on the topic of 
discharged by frustration. Lord Radcliffe stated the doctrine in these terms: 
 
‘… frustration occurs whenever the law recognizes that without default of either 
party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because 
the circumstance in which performance is called for would render it a thing 
radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract. Non haec in 
foedera veni. It was not this that I promised to do… there must be … such a 
change in the significance of the obligation that the thing undertaken would, it 
performed, be a different thing from that contracted for.’ 
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 Murdoch, J and Hughes, W. (1997). Construction Contracts: Law and Management. E & FN Spon. 
London. Pg 336 
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 Ibid 
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 [1956] 2 All ER 145 
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 Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council itself illustrates the 
limitations of the doctrine and, as Lord Denning MR put it in the latter case of The 
Eugenia (1964), ‘it must be more than merely more onerous or more expensive. It must 
be positively unjust to hold the parties bound.’  
 
 
 In Davis case, the contractors tendered to build seventy-eight houses within a 
period of eight months. A covering letter with the tender stated that it was ‘subject to 
adequate supplies of material and labour being available as and when required to carry 
out the work within the time specified’. After further negotiations a formal contract was 
entered into which did not incorporate the terms of the covering letter. The contract was 
on a firm price basis. For various reasons –principally lack of skilled labour – the work 
took twenty two months to complete. The contractors completed the work and, inter alia, 
contended that owing to the long delay due to the scarcity of labour the contract had been 
frustrated and that they were entitled to be paid on quantum meruit basis. The claim 
failed; the contract has not been frustrated. Its performance had merely become more 
onerous than the parties had contemplated. 23 
 
 
 This is not a ground for relieving a party of his contractual obligations.  
 
 ‘The proper test for frustration may be formulated as follows: 
If the literal words of the contract were to be enforced in the changed 
circumstances, would this involve a fundamental or radical change from the 
obligation originally undertaken?’ 24 
 
 
 In the Davis case, it is quite clear that the answer to this question was ‘no’, and 
construction contract have rarely been held to be frustrated.  
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 Powell-Smith, V and Sims, J. [1987]. Ibid. Pg 4 
24
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 One building case where the doctrine was held to operate is Metropolitan Water 
Board v Dick, Kerr & Co. Ltd25. There, in July 1914, the contractors agreed to construct 
reservoir near Staines within a period of six years. The contract empowered the engineer 
to extend the time for completion if the work should be ‘unduly delayed or impeded’ by 
any ‘difficulties, impediments, obstructions, oppositions… whatsoever and howsoever 
occasioned’. War broke out, and in February 1916 the work was stopped by the Minister 
of Munitions who ordered the plant and materials to be sold. This prohibition was still in 
force in November 1917. Notwithstanding the wide power given to the engineer to extend 
time, the House of Lords held that the interruption was of such a character and duration 
as vitally and fundamentally to change the conditions of the contract as at an end. As 
Lord Dunedin said, the government prohibition  
 
‘… has by its consequences made the contract, if resumed, a work under different 
conditions from those of the work when interrupted … the contract being a 
measure and value contract, the whole range of prices might be different. It would 
in my judgment amount, if resumed, to a new contract …’ 
 
 
 Self-induced frustration cannot be relied on. This is illustrated by Mertens v 
Home Freeholds Co. Ltd26, a decision of the Court of Appeal. The facts, in brief, were 
that in May 1916 the defendants contracted to build a house for the plaintiff. Shortly after 
commencement it became apparent to the defendants that their price was too low. In July 
1916 a government order prohibited building work except under licence. The defendants 
applied for a licence but deliberately delayed the work so as to ensure the licence would 
not be granted. The licence was refused and the plaintiff was thereby prevented from 
employing others to do the work – as he was entitled to do under the contract – until 1919, 
when the cost of completion had been considerably increased. It was held that the 
defendants were not entitled to say that the contract had been frustrated by the refusal of a 
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licence since they had themselves deliberately induced that refusal. The plaintiff was 
therefore able to recover from them the additional cost of completion.  
 
 Lord Sterndale put the point succinctly: 
  
‘No man is entitled to take advantage of circumstances as frustration of the 
contract if he has brought those circumstances about himself.’27 
 
 
 In general, it may be said that the frustrating event must be unforeseeable as well 
as outside the control of the parties, but difficulties arise where the contract between the 
parties provide for the type of event which occurred. This does not necessarily prevent 
the contract being discharged by the frustration: whether or not it does so depends upon 
the interpretation of the provision in question. There are numerous illustration of this, 
including Metropolitan Water Board v Dick, Kerr & Co. Ltd28 which discussed above, it 
was held that, dispute the breadth of the extension of time clause, the contract was 
nonetheless frustrated. As Lord Justice Asquith remarked in the later case of Sir Lindsay 
Parkinson & Co. Ltd v Commissioners of Works and Public Buildings29, ‘it was held that 
the parties who framed the provision did not and could not have contemplated an 
interruption of so extreme a nature, and the provision was read as impliedly excluding 
it.’30 
 
 
 At common law, frustration released both parties from further performance of the 
contract. It did not affect any legal rights which had already accrued or payments which 
had been made under the contract terms, the maxim being ‘the loss lies where it falls’. 
One effect of this rule was that where a lump-sum contract was frustrated the contractor 
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could recover nothing in respect of the work which he had done up to the time of 
discharge because he had not completed all the work. 31  
 
 
2.2.2 Discharged by Repudiation 
 
 
There is a distinction between repudiation in the narrow sense and repudiation by 
defective performance. The former is conduct which expressly or implicitly makes it 
clear that the repudiating party will not perform the contract, while the latter arises where 
a contracting party’s performance is so grossly defective as to go to the root of contract. 
32
 
 
 
Where the contract is repudiated by one party and the other party accepts the 
repudiation, the contract is brought to an end and the innocent party is excused from 
further performance. The position was put simply by Lord Blackburn in Mersey Steel & 
Iron Co. v Naylor, Benzon & Co.33 
 
‘Where there is a contract in which there are two parties, each side having to do 
something, if you see that a failure to prepare one part of it goes to the root of the 
contract, goes to the foundation of the whole, it is a good defence to say: “I am 
not going to perform my part of it when that which is the root of the whole and 
the substantial consideration for any performance is defeated by your 
misconduct”.’ 
 
 The essential point is that the wrongful repudiation does not itself discharge the 
contract. The contract will only be terminated if the other party accepts the repudiation. 
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He may elect not to do so and insist that the party perform his contractual obligations, 
although he can still sue for damages in respect of any loss which he sustains as a result 
of the breach: Suisse Atlantique Societe d’ Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche 
Kolen Central34.  
 
 
 ‘Anticipatory repudiation’ occurs where one party states or shows by his conduct 
that he has no intention of performing a future obligation, and is often termed 
‘anticipatory breach’. Although he may treat the contract as being terminated 
immediately, the innocent party need not accept the repudiation but may await the time 
for performance. The proposition is illustrated by White & Carter (Councils) Ltd v 
McGregor35.  
 
 
 In that case the respondent’s sales manager, acting within his authority, contracted 
with the appellants for fixing to litter-bins plaques advertising the respondent’s business. 
On the day that he heard of the contract the respondent send a letter of cancellation to the 
appellants, but they refused to accept it. The contract was for a period of 156 weeks and, 
under its terms, the whole of the contract price became due should any installment remain 
unpaid for a period of four weeks. The respondent did not pay the first installment and 
the appellants sued to recover the whole price. The House of Lord held that they were so 
entitled.  
 
 Lord Reid said : 
‘If one party to a contract repudiates it… the innocent party has an option. He 
may accept the repudiation and sue for damages for breach of contract whether or 
not the time for performance has come; or he may if he chooses disregarded or 
refuse to accept it and then the contract remains in full effect… It is … impossible 
to say that the appellants should be deprived of their right to claim the contract 
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price merely because the benefit to them as against claiming damages and re-
letting their advertising space might be small in comparison with the loss to the 
respondent.’ 
 
 
 The important practical point in this striking case is that on facts of that kind the 
plaintiff was able to go ahead and perform the contract in full rather than having to allow 
the contract to be terminated and sue for damages. In the context of construction 
contracts this principle is of considerable importance since it not infrequently happens 
that one or other party wrongfully repudiates before performance is due. Suppose, for 
example, that having entered into a contract the contractor realizes he has grossly 
underestimated and advises the employer that he is no longer willing to perform. Such a 
statement would undoubtedly amount to an anticipatory breach of contract and, if not 
accepted by the employer, the terms of contract would continue in full force, including 
any liquidated damages clause.  
 
 
However, if the employer does not accept the repudiation the guilty party has in 
effect a time for repentance and may elect to perform. Even if he does not do so he may 
escape liability if, for example, the contract is frustrated before the time for performance 
arrives. This is shown by the old case of Avery v Bowden36 where the defendant chartered 
the plaintiff’s ship at Odessa and undertook to load a cargo within forty-five days. Before 
the time for performance had elapsed the defendant repeatedly told the plaintiff that he 
could not provide the cargo. However, the plaintiff elected for the ship to remain at 
Odessa in the hope that the cargo would be forthcoming. Before the final expiry of the 
forty-five days the Crimean War broke out, thereby making performance of the contract 
illegal. The defendant was held to be relieved of his obligation. Had the plaintiff accepted 
the breach and left the port, he would have been able to recover damages.37 
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 Conversely, this rule can operate the defendant where, as a result of market forces, 
prices rise between the date of anticipatory breach and the date set for performance. In 
such circumstance, if the innocent party does not accept the breach but awaits the time for 
performance, the damages would be assessed at the prices ruling at the date for 
performance.38 
 
 
 Repudiation in the narrow sense may be by words or conduct. Any conduct relied 
on must be unequivocal and must indicate a clear intention not to fulfill the contractual 
obligations. Thus in J. M. Hill & Sons Ltd v London Borough of Camden39, in reaction 
against late payment by a local authority, contractors cut their labour and plant on site 
and slowed-down. They maintained their presence on site, however, and also their 
supervisory staff, canteen facilities and insurance arrangement for those employed on the 
site. The Court of Appeal ruled that this did not amount to repudiation, as contended by 
the local authority. The contractors did not purport to leave the site and their subsequent 
conduct indicated that they intended to treat the contract as subsisting. 40 
 
 
2.2.3 Discharged by Agreement 
 
 
An existing contract may always be brought to an end by a later contract between 
the parties, but the law is both complex and technical. The safest and simplest way of 
doing this is to enter into the new contract under seal, whether or not the original contract 
was so made.41 
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As a matter of strict law, it is not necessary to do this where both parties still have 
obligations to perform under the original contract, which will normally be the case. In 
such an instance each party agrees to release his contractual rights in consideration of a 
release by the other party so that each is giving up something of value. This is called 
‘bilateral discharge’, and the new contract will be enforceable even if it is made orally or 
in writing and not under seal.42  
 
 
Where one party has fulfilled all his obligations under the original contract but the 
other has not, e.g. where a contractor has carried out the work but the employer has not 
paid for it, release will only be effective if executed under seal or if valuable 
consideration is given for the release. The latter is called ‘accord and satisfaction’. In 
construction contracts problems can arise where, for example, the contractor agrees to 
accept less than full payment for the work he has done and the work is in no way 
defective. 43 
 
 
The sort of difficulties that can arise are shown by D. & C. Builders Ltd v Rees44. 
The plaintiff building contractors carried out work for the defendant for which the 
defendant did not pay. Being in dire financial straits, the plaintiff was persuaded by the 
defendant’s wife to accept a smaller sum than was due and to give a receipt which was 
stated to be ‘in completion of the account’. It was held, on a preliminary issue, that the 
plaintiff was entitled to sue for the balance of the money as the alleged discharge was 
unenforceable since there was arguably no valid consideration and, in the words of Lord 
Denning MR, ‘the debtor’s wife held the creditor to ransom’.  
  
 His Lordship said: 
‘The creditor is barred from his legal rights only where it would be inequitable for 
him to insist on them. Where there has been a true record, under which the 
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creditor voluntarily agrees to accept a lesser sum in satisfaction, and the debtor 
acts on that accord by paying the lesser sum and the creditor accepts it, then it is 
inequitable for the creditor afterwards to insist on the balance. Buy he is snot 
bound unless there has been truly an accord between them.’ 
 
 
 Settlement by a lesser sum than that due would, it is suggested, be valid and 
binding if there was a genuine dispute as to whether the work was defective and therefore 
worth less than the contract price.45 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Determination at Contract Act 1950 
 
 
When a contract is terminated, it is said to be discharged and the contracting 
parties are free from further obligations arising from it. A contract may be discharged by 
any one of the following ways. 
 
 
2.3.1 Discharged by Performance 
 
 
Performance is the usual method for the discharge of a contract. Parties to a 
contract are bound by an obligation and they must ‘either perform, or offer to perform, 
their respective promises, unless the performance is dispensed with or excused’ under the 
law.46 When the parties have carried out exactly what they have undertaken to do, there is 
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a complete discharge but if only one party performs his part of the bargain, he alone will 
be discharged. As a general rule, performance must be strictly in accordance with the 
terms of the contract unless the parties have agreed otherwise.47 
 
 
Section 40 of the Contract Act 1950 further provides: 
 
When a party to a contract has refused to perform, or disabled himself from 
performing, his promise in its entirely, the promise may put an end to the contract, 
unless he has signified, by world or conduct, his acquiescence in its continuance. 
 
 
 As a general rule, a promisor must be prepared to perform his obligations at the 
time and place at which he has undertaken to do. If a promise is to be performed on a 
certain day and the promisor has not undertaken to perform it without application by the 
promise, ‘it is the duty of the promisee to apply for performance at a proper place and 
within the hours of business’.48 The question of what is a proper time and place is, in 
each particular case, a question of fact. On the other hand, when a promise is to be 
performed on a certain day, and the promisor has undertaken to perform it without any 
application by the promisee, ‘the promisor may perform it at any time during the usual 
hours of business on the day and at the place at which the promise ought to be 
performed’.49 Where no time is fixed for performance and an application by the promisee 
is not required, the promise ‘must be performed within a reasonable time’.50 The question 
of ‘what is a reasonable time’ is, in each particular case, a question of fact.51  
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 It is common to provide a term in a contract that a delay, however slight, in 
performance will entitle the other to free himself from the contract. Time is said to be ‘of 
the essence’ of the contract. Section 56 of the Contract Act 1950 lays down the law 
relating to the effects of such terms, and it has been judicially recognized that this section 
does not differ from the common law. Salleh Abas F.J. in Sim Chio Huat v Wong Ted 
Fui52 expressly approved the statement of the law in Yeoh Kim Pong (Realty) Ltd v Ng 
Kim Pong53. His Lordship stated that if ‘in a contract in which time is of essence, a party 
fails to perform it by the stipulated time, the innocent party has the right either to rescind 
the contract, or to treat it as still subsisting. If he treats it either expressly or by conduct as 
still continuing, the contract exists but time ceases to be of the essence and become at 
large.’ In the instant case, the Federal Court held that by allowing the delivery dates to 
pass, by agreeing to the work being done by the developer and by further ordering extra 
work, the respondent had waived his right to rescind the contract, and consequently was 
deemed to have opted to treat the contract as subsisting.54 
 
 
2.3.2 Discharged by Agreement 
 
 
A contract that is created by consent can be extinguished by consent, expressed or 
implied. The consent of all parties to the contract is necessary. Expressed consent may be 
given at the time of the contract or subsequently. For instance, the parties may agree at 
the time of making the contract that on the occurrence of an event, one or more parties 
will be discharged. Consent given subsequent to the contract may be a waiver, release, 
novation, remission or rescission.55  
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Section 63 and 64 of the Contract Act 1950 provide for the discharge of the 
contracts by consent. Section 63 deals with the effects of novation, rescission and 
alteration, and read as follows: 
 
If the parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, to rescind or 
alter it, the original contract need not be performed.  
 
 
 Novation is the substitution of a new contract for an earlier one, particularly a 
contract between a creditor, a debtor and a third party whereby they agree to substitute a 
third party for the debtor or creditor under the original contract which will be discharged. 
This is illuminated in Illustration (a) which reads: 
 
A owes money to B under a contract. It is agreed between A, B and C that B shall 
henceforth C as his debtor, instead of A. the old debt of A to B is at an end, and a 
new debt from C to B has been contracted. 
 
 
 The consideration for a new arrangement is the mutual discharge of the original 
contract, and consent of all parties is secured. Illustration (c) demonstrates the need for 
such consent, and reads as follows: 
 
A owes B RM1,000 under a contract. B owes C RM1,000. B orders A to credit C 
with RM1,000 in his books, but C does not assent to the arrangement. B still owes 
C RM1,000, and no new contract has been entered into. 
 
 
 Illustration (b) gives an example of the alteration of a contract where A owes B 
RM10,000 and enters into a arrangement with B whereby he gives B a mortgage of his 
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(A’s) estate for RM5,000 in place of the debt of RM10,000. This new contract 
extinguishes the original contract. 56 
 
 
 An executory contract may be rescinded by the consent of all parties to the 
contract. In a contract for the sale of goods, a buyer and a seller may agree to rescind the 
contract at any time before delivery of the goods or the payment of the price. This is not 
the same as the right of a party to rescind a contract when the other party failed to fulfill 
his obligations under it. Rescission for cause also gives the party rescinding it the right to 
receive damages for breach of contract. Suppose that X promises to deliver certain goods 
to B on a particular day and fails to carry out that promise. B may rescind the contract for 
breach without prejudice to his rights to compensation. 
 
 
 Section 64 deals with remission of performance and read as follows: 
 
Every promisee may dispense with or remit, wholly or in part, the performance of 
the promise made to him, or may extend the time for such performance, or may 
accept instead of it any satisfaction which he thinks fit.57 
 
 
In Pan Ah Ba & Anor v Nanyang Construction Sdn Bhd58, the Federal Court 
allowed the estate of a deceased who had entered into a contract with the respondent 
company for the purchase of land and premises, to recover the deposit paid on the 
grounds that the respondent’s letter to be deceased was a dispensation within the meaning 
of section 64. Azmi L.P., relying on the decision of the Privy Council in Chunna Mal 
Ram Nath v Mool Chand59, a case on appeal from India on a provision in pari material 
with section 64, stated that to constitute a dispensation, ‘neither consideration nor an 
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agreement is necessary provided of course that is clear from the evidence that the 
promisee had so dispensed with the performance of the promise by a voluntary conscious 
act and it must be an affirmative act on his part’.60  
  
 
2.3.3 Discharged by Impossibility of Performance 
 
 
Section 57 lays down the law relating to two categories of impossibility of 
performance; first impossibility of performance at the time a contract is made and 
impossibility after it has been made. In the first category, it is provided that ‘an 
agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void’. Thus as illuminated in Illustration (a), 
an agreement ‘to discover treasure by magic’ is obviously void. Either one or both parties 
may be aware of the impossibility but if one party knew or ‘with reasonable diligence, 
might have known, and which the promisee did not know, to be impossible or unlawful, 
the promisor must make compensation to the promisee for any loss which the promisee 
sustains through the non-performance of the promise’. Illustration (c) gives the example 
of A, a married person, promising to marry B and his personal law forbids him to practice 
polygamy. A is liable to make compensation to B for the loss caused to her by the non-
performance of his promise. 
 
 
The second category concerns contracts that have become impossible to perform 
subsequent to their making. In the words of section 57(2), a contract ‘becomes impossible, 
or by reason of some event the promisor could not prevent, unlawful’. This covers the 
common law doctrine of frustration. A number of theory exists as to the basis of the 
doctrine, including the notion that the court is merely reading an implied term into the 
contract. In its essential form, the doctrine of frustration provides for the termination of a 
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contract if events occur which radically change the circumstances contemplated by the 
parties.61 
 
 
Section 57 (2) lays down a rule of positive law and does not leave the matter to be 
determined according to the intention of the parties. Therefore, the doctrine of frustration 
is applied not on the ground that the parties themselves have impliedly agreed to release 
each other from the performance of the contract, but on the basis of supervening 
impossibility causing the whole purpose of a contract to be radically different or its 
performance has become ‘unlawful’. In applying section 57(2), the court will examine the 
nature and term of the contract, the circumstances under which it was made and the event 
frustrating the contract, including whether it has been self-induced. In Ramli bin Zakaria 
& Ors v Government of Malaysia62, the Federal Court accepted the view that a self-
induced frustration does not discharge a party of his contractual obligations. A court will 
further need to satisfy itself that the events have substantially prevented the performance 
of the contract as a whole. If in fact the contract has been ‘impossible’ or ‘unlawful’, the 
contract is automatically discharged without the need for election by either party. 63 
 
 
2.3.4 Discharged by Breach 
 
 
 
When a promisor fails to perform his obligations or to tender performance, there 
is a breach of contract which entitles the party not in breach to take appropriate action 
which may include repudiation. The statutory definition of discharge by breach as 
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enacted in section 40 of the Contract Act 1950 is co-extensive with English Law64 and 
read as follows: 
 
When a party to a contract has refused to perform, or disabled himself from 
performing, his promise in its entirety, the promisee may put an end to the 
contract, unless he has signified, by words or conduct, his acquiescence in its 
continuance.  
 
 
 The right to ‘put an end of the contract’ may be exercised in two situations, 
namely refusal by the promisor to perform and disability to perform. The party not in 
breach has the option either to continue with the contract and claim damages or repudiate 
the contract. Continuation with the contract despite the breach may be ‘signified by 
words or conduct’. 65 
 
 
 It is clear that a refusal to perform when performance of the obligations is due 
will enable the party not in default to repudiate, but that which is difficult to determine is 
the question of when a party can be considered to have refused to perform and whether 
the refusal is in respect of a ‘promise in its entirely’. In most instances, a party in default 
does not categorically state that he is refusing to perform and it is often a risky business 
for the party not in default to decide if the former’s conduct constitutes a refusal. A 
wrongful repudiation of the contract, say on account of a delay in payment or delivery, 
may open himself to a counter-claim by the other party.66  
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2.4 Conclusion 
 
 
A contract creates a legal obligation upon the contracting parties. The discharge 
of a contract means when the parties are freed from such obligation. Under Common Law 
and the Contract Act 1950, there are various ways to discharge a contract. A contract can 
only be discharged by frustration, repudiation and also discharged by agreement under 
the Common Law. However, under the Contract Act 1950, a contract may be discharged 
in the various ways such as by performance 67 , by breach 68 , by impossibility of 
performance69 and by agreement70. The following chapter will focus on the determination 
of contract under the PWD 203A and PAM Standard Form of Contract. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
 
 
DETERMINATION OF CONTRACT BY EMPLOYER IN CONSTRUCTION 
UNDER PWD 203A AND PAM STANDARD FORMS OF CONTRACT 
 
 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
 
 In construction, every such building activity may create its own unique set of 
requirements and circumstances. The different sectors including employer groups, 
contractors, suppliers, manufacturers, professionals have their own interests which are 
very often divergent and competing in nature. This division is best represented by the 
different and even opposing commercial objectives of the employer and contractor. 71 
 
 
 The standard form of building contract is one of the key methods of ameliorating 
a potentially fractious relationship to achieve a common end. It evidences the legal 
relationship between the parties in contract and provides the administrative procedures 
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necessary for the realization of the legal relationship. Any standard form of building 
contract would need to appreciate and incorporate all the special requirements and 
circumstances that a project would call for, particularly the required work, the price to 
pay and the other terms under which the contract is to be performed, settled and disputed. 
 
 
 However, this is not to displace the notion that every building project, irrespective 
of its cost and complexity would have a common set of core obligations of the parties 
which needs to be a set out within the parameters of the project. In order for the process 
to work effectively, it is essential that the standard form is understood in term of the way 
it distribute risk. A successful standard form of building contract would also lend itself to 
regulate the day to day relationship on site and provide a clear and definitive 
understanding to the parties, professionals and site personnel of their roles and 
responsibilities.72  
 
 
In Malaysia, there are several types of Standard Form of Contract available to use 
in construction, such as PWD 203A, PAM, CIDB, IEM and etc. The PWD forms of 
contract are the de facto standard forms of contraction contract used by the Malaysian 
public sector. In fact, these has been in recent years increasing usage of the PWD forms 
with amendments by the private sector as well, especially in civil engineering 
construction.73 The PAM standard form of building contract was very widely used in the 
private sector. Besides that, all standard forms of construction contract contain clauses for 
determination of contracts by employer or determination of contract by contractor. 
However, under the PWD 203A, there are only provision of clause for the determination 
by the employer. 
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3.2 Determination of Contract by Employer under PWD 203A Standard Form of 
Contract 
 
 
   Under PWD 203A Standard Form of Contract, only the determination of 
contract by employer is allowed. 74  Under Clause 51, this clause deals with the 
Government’s right to determine the employment of the contractor and sets out the 
procedure to be followed when this occurs. The contract itself does not come to an end 
but remains in being, albeit in a modified form.75 It is the employment of the contractor 
under the contract which is determined and the parties’ rights after a valid determination 
are governed by the express contractual provisions.  
 
 
 The contractual power of determination is given to the Government “without 
prejudice to any other rights and remedies” available to the Government, particularly the 
right to treat the Contract as discharged for repudiatory breach, i.e. a breach which goes 
to the root of the contract.76 This equivalent phrase which is found in PAM form of 
contract and its English predecessors has been construed in the English case of Sutcliffe v 
Chippendale & Edmonson 77  not to be limited to the rights or examples of defaults 
enabling the employer to take action against the Contractor as set out in the clause. In 
other words, the employer may still be able to treat the contract as terminated under the 
common law if the default and conduct of the contractor so justify, without the employer 
having to resort to the determination clause. The Government has therefore the right of 
election herein to exercise either a contractual determination or common law termination 
or both but in alternative. The latter course is pertinent in the event that the contractual 
determination is found inapplicable for one reason or another, and common law 
termination may then be relied upon by the Government.78  
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 That notwithstanding, it is imperative on the part of the Government to 
unequivocally specify in the notice of determination as to whether the Government is 
only exercising its rights under this clause or alternatively for discharging the contact 
under the common law. It was held in Malayan Flour Mills Bhd v Raja Lope & Tan Co79 
that the notice of determination which specifically refers only to the determination clause 
was not sufficient or wide enough for the employer to rely on rescission of the contract 
under common law in the alternative, distinguishing Architectural Installation Services 
Ltd v James Gibbons Windows Ltd80.81 
  
 
 Clause 51 (a) sets out five different defaults by the contractor which may give rise 
to the determination of his employment, which read as follow: 
 
Without prejudice to any other rights or remedies which the Government may 
possess, if the Contractor shall make default in any one or more of the following 
respects, that is to say: 
(i) if he without reasonable cause suspends the carrying out of the whole or 
any part of the works before completion, or 
(ii) if he fails to proceed regularly and diligently with the works, or 
(iii) if he fails to execute the works in accordance with this contract or 
persistently neglect to carry out his obligations under this contract, or 
(iv) if he refuses or persistently neglects to comply with a written notice from 
the SO to remove and replace any defective work or improper materials or 
goods, or 
(v) if he fails to comply with the provision of Clause 27(a), (b) and (d) here of; 
 
then the SO may give to him a notice by registered post or by recorded delivery 
specifying the default, and if the contractor shall either continue such default for 
fourteen (14) days after receipt of such notice or shall at any time thereafter repeat 
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such default (whether previously repeated or not), then the Government may 
thereupon by a notice sent by registered post or by recorded delivery determine 
the employment of the contractor under this contract. 
 
 
 Therefore, if the contractor committed one or more of these defaults, then the 
Superintending Officer may issued a notice by registered post which must specify the 
default either by naming it or setting out in full the relevant paragraphs of sub-clause 
51(a). It is not mandatory for the Superintending Officer to discern into and provide the 
particulars of the defaults.82 Be that as it may, it was held in Fajar Menyensing Sdn Bhd v 
Angsana Sdn Bhd83, whilst construing the equivalent clause under the PAM form of 
contract, that assertions of fact and not mere opinion would be required of the 
Superintending Officer in the specification of the default. This clause does not empower 
the Superintending Officer to issue a notice of default based on his opinion but that the 
Contractor has as a matter of fact made a default in one or more of the matters 
enumerated in the clause. This distinction may not be easily appreciated and put into 
practice. It is submitted that the Government in this regard cannot merely rely on the 
subjective views of the Superintending Officer but must have other cogent and 
corroborative evidence of default on the part of the contractor.  
 
 
 Upon the receipt of the notice of default, the contractor can take one or more of 
three courses as suggested by Professor Powell-Smith in the PAM Commentary: 
 
(i) he can dispute the notice, i.e. deny that he has defaulted as alleged by the 
Superintending Officer, 
(ii) he can remedy the default and inform the Superintending Officer as soon as 
possible after receipt of the notice how the default is being remedied. The 
time-limit of 14 days should be noted, i.e. the contractor must begin to remedy 
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the default within the period. It may not be possible to complete remedying 
the default within that period but it should be sufficient if the contractor begun 
and continues to do so. Thus, if the contractor in fact putting the default right, 
the Superintending Officer and Government must accept that, or  
(iii)he can continue the default and risk the consequences of his failure to remedy 
it. 
 
 
If the contractor chooses the first course, he should give a notice of dispute or 
difference to the Superintending Officer for a decision under clause 54 on the grounds 
that the notice of default was wrongly given, thus protecting his position.  
 
 
Should the contractor admit the default and remedy it, he must ensure that he does 
not repeat. Any repetition of a default which notice has once been validly served does not 
require a further 14-day notice of default. For example, if the contractor defaults by 
failing to proceed regularly and diligently and in response to the Superintending Officer’s 
notice of default resumes proper working, but subsequently defaults in the same respect, 
the Superintending Officer need not serve a further notice. In such a case the Government 
can proceed to determine the contractor’s employment under the contract without more 
ado. This is the purpose of the words in parenthesis in clause 51(a).84  
 
 
If the contractor adopts the third course and continues the default for 14 days after 
the receipt of the Superintending Officer’s notice (or repeats a default after remedying it), 
then the Government may determine the Contractor’s employment under the contract. 
There is no stipulated time within which the Government must act accordingly and it is 
submitted that the Government must do so within a reasonable time, preferably forthwith 
upon the expiry of the 14-day grace period to remedy the default. In Fajar Menyensing 
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Sdn Bhd v Angsana Sdn Bhd85, it was held that the notice of determination under the 
equivalent PAM form of contract must be sent by registered post. There is no Recorded 
Delivery Act in Malaysia to effect sending by recorded delivery. However, in DMCD 
Museum Associated Sdn Bhd v Shademaker (M) Sdn Bhd (No 2)86 and SK Styrofoam Sdn 
Bhd v Pembinaan LCL Sdn Bhd87, it was held that the notice of determination send under 
same PAM form of contract by hand was valid service by reason that the clear trend of 
the current day is to take a business common sense approach. It is submitted that until 
there is a clear pronouncement on this point by the Malaysian appellate court, it is safer 
to send the notice of determination (as well as the earlier notice of default) by registered 
post. The notice takes effect from the moment the notice is received by the contractor and 
clause 51 (c) thereafter applies.  
 
 
Unlike the PAM form of contract which stipulates that the notice of determination 
must not be served unreasonable or vexatiously, there is no such equivalent provision 
herein. There is nevertheless room to argue following Renard Constructions Ltd v 
Minister of Public Works88 that the implication of a reasonableness limitation in arriving 
at the decision to determine may be imposed by the court. It should however be noted 
that the determination clause in the Renard Constructions case is very wide in respect of 
the grounds stipulated for determination which included in the performance of any 
contractual stipulation. This is arguably comparable with clause 51 (a) (iii) herein. If the 
requirement for reasonableness is implied, it was held in JM Hill & Sons Ltd v London 
Borough of Camden89 that it protects a party where there is “something accidental or 
purely incidental so that the Court could see that [the other party] was taking advantage 
of the other side in circumstances in which, from a business point of view, it would be 
totally unfair and almost smacking of sharp practice”. In other words it is an act which 
can objectively be judged to be unreasonable. In the Renard Constructions case, it was 
held that the principal acted unreasonable based on misleading, incomplete and 
                                                 
85
 [1998] 2 AMR 1530 
86
 [1999] 4 MLJ 243 
87
 [2004] 5 MLJ 385 
88
 [1992] 26 NSWLR 234 
89
 [1980] 18 BLR 31 
  
42 
 
prejudicial information. The defaults that trigger the operation of this clause 51 PWD 
203A form of contract are now considered seriatim.  
 
 
3.2.1 Suspension of Work 
 
 
There is a distinction between the suspensions of work versus the abandonment of 
work. If the work is suspended, it means that the Contractor still intends to resume the 
carrying out of the work at some point in time. If the contractor is however no longer 
interested to recommence the carrying out of the work at all, then the work is abandoned. 
For the sub-clause 51(a)(i), this does not apply if the work is abandoned.90  
 
 
The default of wholly suspending the works must be without reasonable cause. 
Reasonable cause is not defined. It is submitted that reasonable cause should be a matter 
which is within the responsibility and control of the Government or neither of both the 
Government and the Contractor. It should not be a matter within the assumed risk of the 
contractor under the contact. The operative wording is “wholely suspends” and anything 
less than that is insufficient.91  
 
 
3.2.2 Failure to Proceed Regularly and Diligently 
 
 
This default is a breach of the contractor’s obligation under clause 38(b) after 
obtaining possession of the site. It is basically a question of fact and the dictum in the 
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West Faulkner Associates v London Borough of Newham92 is most illustrative for its 
practical application. In this case, Hirst LJ constructed the phrase as follows: 
 
Taken together the obligation upon the contractor is essentially to proceed 
continuously, industriously, and efficiently with appropriate physical resources so 
as to progress the works steadily towards completion substantial in accordance 
with the contractual requirements as to time, sequence and quality of work. 
 
 It must be noted that failure to proceed regularly and diligently with the works is 
one of the grounds in clause 51 which may lead to determination of the contractor’s 
employment by the Government. Therefore, this sub-clause 51(a)(ii) may be relied upon 
if the contractor has abandoned the carrying out of the work.93 
 
 
3.2.3 Failure to Execute Works in Accordance with Contract or Persistently 
Neglects to Carry Out Contractual Obligations 
 
 
This is very widely couched and overlaps with the other stipulated grounds of 
default. Although the clause has two limbs which are mutually exclusive, it is submitted 
that the first limb of default ought to be persistently committed, just as in the second 
limb, before determination could be safely invoked. Persistence is of course a question of 
fact involving both frequency and degree.94  
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3.2.4 Neglect to remove defective work 
 
 
This is a breach of the contractor’s obligation under clause 5(b) to comply with 
instructions. Unlike the equivalent provision found in the PAM form of contract which 
expressly stipulates that the neglect must have materially affected the work, it is 
submitted that the neglect under this clause must have substantially affected the works 
before determination could be safely invoked. Otherwise, it may be more prudent for the 
Government to exercise its remedy under clause 5 (b) to get a third party to carry out the 
instruction and recover the costs from the contractor accordingly.95 
 
 
3.2.5 Subletting without Consent and Failure to Incorporate Automatic 
Determination Provision in Sub-contract 
 
 
Under the sub-clause 51(a)(v),  the employer may determinate contractor’s 
employment if he fails to comply the provision of Clause 27(a), (b) and (d). The 
breaches must be for both clauses 27 (a) and (b) conjunctively before determination can 
be invoked, which is not very sensible. There is perhaps a typographical error which 
should correctly have been breach of “clause 27(a) and (d)” disjunctively, i.e. violation 
of prohibition against subletting without consent or assignment, like in the PAM form of 
contract. 96 
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3.2.6 Bankruptcy, Insolvency, etc. of the Contractor 
 
 
This is an additional ground of determination afforded to the Government without 
even having to serve a prior notice of default to the contractor. In this respect the 
Government merely has to serve the notice of determination by registered post on the 
contractor upon the occurrence of one of the specified acts. All the acts of default 
specified here focus on the financial precariousness of the contractor. The contractor is 
thus in effect deemed to be financially precarious and presumably unable to carry on and 
complete its obligation under the contract97 upon the occurrence of any of the specified 
acts, though it may in fact not necessarily be so, such as if the contractor is merely 
making a scheme of arrangement or composition with its creditors.98 
 
 
3.2.7 Effects of Determination of Contractor’s Employment 
 
 
Besides those defaults that listed under the Clause 51 (a) and (b), Clause 51(c) 
also provides the effects of determination of contractor’s employment. By Clause 51(c) 
paragraph (i), the contractor is to surrender and hand over the site to the Government and 
remove his personnel and workmen. The contractor must however leave all temporary 
buildings, plant, tools, equipment, goods and unfixed materials belonging to him except 
as and when specifically directed otherwise by Superintending Officer in writing. This 
provision can only extend to goods and unfixed material which belong to the contractor 
and cannot confer rights in respect of items which belong to third parties99. Similarly, 
this provision does not apply to plant and equipment which are leased or rented by the 
contractor for use in the works. 100 
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Besides, paragraph (ii) basically provides that the Government is entitled to either 
engage another contractor or on its own departmentally to carry out and complete the 
works. Both the Government and the completion contractor are given the express right to 
enter upon the works. They are also empowered to purchase goods and materials 
necessary for the carrying out and completion of the works. 
 
 
In paragraph (iii), the contractor is obliged if required by the Superintending 
Officer to assign to the Government without payment the benefit of any contracts 
whether for supply of goods or material or execution of work. It also empowers the 
Government to pay directly any supplier or sub-contractor for any goods or material or 
work done but not already paid for by the contractor and is stated to be in addition to the 
Government’s right to pay nominated sub-contractors and/or nominated suppliers direct 
under clause 28. If the Government makes such payments, the Government has the right 
to recover pursuant to clause 51 (c)(v), or by way of a suit, or to deduct them from any 
sum due to the contractor.101 
 
 
Paragraph (iv) required the contractor to remove from the site any temporary 
buildings, plant, tools, equipment goods and materials belonging to or hired by him upon 
being required to do so in writing by the Superintending Officer. It goes on to confer on 
the Government a power of sale of those items if the contractor fails to do so within a 
reasonable time. That notwithstanding, this power is restricted to those items which are 
the property of the contractor in law and cannot extend to items hired by him. The 
Government is exempted from liability for any loss or damage to the items should the 
Government exercise this power. The Government is to hold the proceeds of sale less the 
cost incurred to the credit of the contractor in the final accounting pursuant to clause 
51(c)(v).102 
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Furthermore, paragraph (v) provides for the financial settlement following the 
determination. Its effect is that the Government may claim any direct loss and/or damage 
the Government has suffered as a result of the determination. The loss and/or damage 
means that what is recoverable equivalent to the compensation recoverable for loss or 
damage caused by a breach of contract.103 The loss or damage would normally include 
the additional completion costs and loss of use and/or expenses incurred as a result of 
delayed completion of the works caused by the determination. 
 
 
The loss and/or damage payable has to be certified by the Superintending Officer 
and he is obliged in his certification to set out separately various items connected with 
the completion costs and adjusted Final Contract Sum. The sum certified by the 
Superintending Officer is expressed to be binding and conclusive on the contractor. This 
is on the face contradictory with clause 49, but it may be reconciled in that the non-
conclusiveness of the certificate as provided in clause 49 deals only with the quality or 
acceptance of the certified work done whereas this clause is concerned with the sum of 
the certified loss or damage. That notwithstanding, it is submitted that the sum may 
arguably still be reviewed if the certification is not done in accordance with the terms of 
the contract.104 
 
 
Finally, for the paragraph (vi), it provides that if the Government completes the 
works departmentally rather than appointing another contractor to do so, the 
Superintending Officer whilst certifying under clause 51(c)(v) must provide an 
allowance for costs of supervision, interest, plant and equipment depreciation, overhead 
charges and profit in computing the completion costs.105  
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3.3 Determination of Contract by Employer under PAM 1998 Standard Form of 
Contract 
 
 
Clause 25.0 in PAM 1998 form of contract is a forfeiture clause which provides 
an express contractual right to the employer to determine the contractor’s employment on 
the happening of specified defaults 106 , automatic determination upon bankruptcy, 
liquidation and other events symptomatic of insolvency 107  and the effect of 
determination108. Clause 25.0 seeks to improve on the common law rights and liabilities 
of the parties after the exercise of the power of determination until the final settlement.109 
 
 
It is the contractor’s employment under the contract which is determined and the 
parties’ rights after a valid determination continue to be governed by the express 
contractual provisions. The contract itself does not com to an end but remains in being, 
albeit in a modified form.110 Indeed, Clause 25.0 goes on to specify the relative rights and 
obligation of the parties in the event of determination of employment. The effect of 
determination is to relieve the contractor of his obligation to perform further work under 
the contract or to remove his right to do so, depending upon who is exercising the right of 
determination. The arbitration agreement in Clause 34.0 survives the determination.111 In 
contrast, this is to be distinguished from determining the contract when the ending of the 
contract extinguishes all its machinery. The aggrieved party must proceed against the 
other for breach in the absence of an agreed settlement.  
 
 
Since the contractual power of determination given to the employer is expressed 
to be ‘without prejudice to any other rights and remedies he may possess’, it is therefore 
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in addition to and not in substitution of his common law rights. This express reservation 
to the employer of any other rights or remedies preserves his normal rights at common 
law against the contractor. Judge Stabb QC in Sutcliffe v Chippendale & Edmondson112 
considered the phrase in the light of two arguments. Firstly, the defendant architects 
contended that the employer’s right to determine the contractor’s employment under 
Clause 25 of a contract was limited to the rights specified in that clause. In the alternative, 
it was argued that the employer’s rights were limited to repudiatory acts no less than the 
examples of default set out in the clause. Judge Stabb QC rejected both arguments and 
held that the employer is entitled to treat the contract as at an end in common law as the 
contractor’s conduct can be properly interpreted as amounting to repudiation of the 
contract.  
 
 
Therefore, the phrase ‘without prejudice to any other rights and remedies he may 
possess’, has the simple effect of preserving those rights in additional to and alongside 
the specific rights conferred by the contract. If the contractor is guilty of default which is 
both a repudiation and also an event which gives rise to a right of determination under 
clause 25.1, the employer has an option. Under the PAM 1998 form of contract, he may 
either follow the procedure of Clause 25.2, whereupon he will have the advantage of 
Clause 25.4 or he may accept the repudiation and treat the contract as discharged for 
repudiatory breach, namely a breach which goes to the root of the contract.113 Thus, even 
if the operation of Clause 25.0 is hampered by the failure to comply exactly with some of 
its procedural provisions or because the required ground for determination cannot be 
established with precision, there could be grounds available to the employer for justifying 
a common law determination if the contractor by his conduct evinces an intention that he 
is no longer to be bound by the contract.114 
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On the other hand, the point that Clause 25.0 specifies the rights and obligations 
of the parties following the exercise of the power of determination by the employer, and 
leaves the common law rights of the parties intact, is of some significance. Particularly 
where the ground of determination is not one which would be treated as repudiatory at 
common law, it has been held that the employer determining is entitled only to such 
remedy as the contract itself specifically provides.115 
 
 
 Default under Clause 25.1 of the PAM 1998 form of contract by the contractor is 
one of the major avenue of reasons allowing the employer to exercise his power of 
determination; the other being insolvency under clause 25.3. Clause 25.1 sets out six 
different defaults different defaults by the contractor which may give rise to 
determination of his employment, any one of which would be a breach of contract. Any 
of the said defaults must occur, or at least be occasioned, before the Certification of 
Practical Completion is issued by the architect. Determination is considered inappropriate 
after practical completion. The defaults as identified in clause 25.1 (i) to (iv) which 
trigger the operation of the determination procedure are now considered separately.  
 
 
3.3.1 Suspension of Work  
 
 
 The default consists of the contractor wholly suspending the carrying out of the 
works before completion ‘without reasonable cause’. The operative word is ‘wholly’ 
which means ‘completely, totally or entirely’. The phrase is ‘wholly suspends’ and so 
anything less than that, including a partial suspension of the work, is insufficient. 
Suspension does not imply that the contractor must necessarily have left the site but 
merely that no work is being carried out. The contractor’s equipment may still be present 
but there must be a complete withdrawal of manpower from the site. On the other hand, 
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the contractor may not maintain that he has not suspended work by the mere presence of 
equipment if no activity is being carried out. While it may constitute failure to proceed 
regularly and diligently under Clause 25.1 (ii), anything less than total cessation of work 
may not be sufficient. It is not clear from the authorities if the employer can argue the de 
minimis rule and rely on this ground if there is only an insignificant amount of work 
being carried out on site, as compared to the work still to be completed. Under the de 
minimis rule, the law does not regard minute failure as departures from the contractual 
obligation116.  
 
 
 There must not only be suspension of the works but a suspension ‘without 
reasonable cause’. Under the PAM form of contract, this was the condition which many 
an employer had difficulty in establishing. In practice, there will always be some cause 
for the contractor wholly suspending the works and the question of whether the cause is 
reasonable is a difficult one to determine.117  
 
 
 Clause 25.1 (i) provides a definition of ‘reasonable cause’. Hence, the employer 
cannot under the PAM 1998 Form determine the contract if the contractor wholly 
suspends the carrying out of the works in compliance with an instruction from the 
architect or in compliance with a direction or an order from a statutory or governmental 
body as these fall within the definition ‘reasonable cause’. On the other hand, it is not 
reasonable cause to wholly suspend work if the architect fails to provide necessary 
instruction.118 
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3.3.2 Failure to Proceed Regularly and Diligently 
 
 
 This default is a breach of the express obligation of the contractor under Clause 
21.0 to proceed ‘regularly and diligently’ with the works after being given possession of 
the site. It is a most difficult ground to establish in practice, and essential it is a question 
of fact. As expressly provided in Clause 3.5, a simple failure by the contractor to comply 
with his own works programme, which is not a contract document, is not itself a breach 
of contract. But removing labour and plant from the site might well be constructed as 
evidence of the lack of intention to proceed regularly and diligently.119 
 
 
 However, a note of caution has been raised in view of the case of Greater London 
Council v Cleverland Bridge & Engineering Co Ltd120 in which the relevant contract term 
between the parties provided for the contractors to be discharged if they failed to exercise 
due diligence or expedition in the performance of the contract. Staughton J held that 
while neglect might entitle the employer to discharge the contractor under the term, it 
would not by itself be a breach of contract on the part of the contractor if, in the 
eventuality, the overall deadline had been complied with. Since it was for the contractor 
to plan and perform his works as desired within the contract period, it could not be said 
that the contractors had failed to exercise due diligence and expedition. Therefore, unless 
the contractual Date for Completion has passed or it is patently obvious that it will not be 
met, employers need to exercise caution in relying on the contractor’s failure to proceed 
regularly and diligently with the works as a ground on which to determine 
employment.121 
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3.3.3 Failure to Remove Defective Work 
 
 
 
 Under Clause 25.1 (iii) is a breach of the contractor’s obligation under Clause 2.1 
to comply with the architect’s instructions. The particular instructions referred to are 
those pertaining to Clause 6.4. This ground is not as wide as might appear at first sight. 
The contractor must either refuse and/or neglect to comply with a written instruction 
from the architect requiring him to remove and remedy defective work and/or materials 
under Clause 6.4. Clause 25.1 (iii) is in tandem with Clause 6.4 of the PAM 1998 as the 
architect is given specific power which was not available under the PAM 1969 Form to 
instruct that defective work be remedied. A valid Clause 6.4 instruction or notice must be 
issued before this ground for determination under Clause 25.1 (iii) can be invoked. There 
must be either an outright refusal and/or a persistent neglect by the contractor to comply 
with its terms. Persistence suggests that there must have been reminders which have been 
ignored by the contractor. It cannot be said to be persistent if the contractor had simply 
failed to comply with a written instruction under Clause 6.4 without a reminder.  
 
 
 It is also a precondition that ‘the works must be materially affected’. The meaning 
of this phrase can be interpreted in three possible  ways: first, it had a material effect on 
the progress of the works; second, that the works would not be suitable for its intended 
purpose if they were completed with the defect unremedied; third, it would seriously 
affect subsequent work if the defective work was unremedied for an extended period, for 
example a defective foundation would lead to anything erected on it becoming unsafe.122 
 
 
 Determination of the contractor’s employment under this clause is an extreme and 
longstop remedy. It must be noted that under Clause 6.5, the employer has the alternative 
remedy to employ others to carry out the instruction. Thus, if the defects can be easily 
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remedied at any time during the progress of the works, the employer may not be justified 
in determining the contract under this provision or at common law. 
 
 
 Where the architect alleges that the contractor’s work is not up to the required 
standard of appearance he should make an objective assessment. The degree of 
objectively exercised in such instance should be what other reasonable architects would 
accept. Almost inevitably the question arises as to whether the architect’s opinion on the 
matter is reasonable having regard to the specification requirements in the contract. 
Unless the workmanship is so poor as to be manifestly below any standard that might 
reasonably be required, failure to comply with a Clause 6.4 instruction issued in 
consequence may not give rise to a right of determination under Clause 25.1 (iii).123 
 
 
3.3.4 Assignment or Sub-letting without Consent  
 
 
 Under the PAM 1998 Form, Clause 17.0 regulates both assignment and sub-
letting and these are therefore brought within the scope of Clause 25.1 (iv) which makes 
both assignment and sub-letting without consent a ground for determination. The defaults 
here are firstly, assigning the contract without the consent of the employer under Clause 
17.1; and secondly, sub-letting part of the works without the consent of the architect 
under Clause 17.2.  
 
 
 At first sight it would seem to be a severe remedy. However, the contractor is 
safeguarded in three ways: firstly, the employer’s consent cannot be ‘unreasonable 
withheld’; secondly, the contractor must have failed to comply for 14 days and; thirdly, 
the determination by the employer must not be ‘unreasonable and vexations’. Assignment 
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or sub-letting in themselves would not be necessarily be causes for determining at 
common law. However, it may give rise to a claim for nominal damages124.125 
 
 
3.3.5 Abandoned the Contract 
 
 
 Clause 25.1 (v) of the PAM 1998 Form is a new provision not found in the PAM 
1969 Form. It brings in the common law ground for determining of the contract on the 
basis that the contractor has abandoned the contract with no intention of returning to 
continue. The absolute refusal to carry out the work or abandonment of the work before it 
is practically completed without any lawful excuse is a repudiation by the contractor. 
Abandonment of the work or refusal to carry on is plainly a breach which goes to the root 
of the contract.126 
 
 
3.3.6 Persistent Refusal or Failure to Comply with An Architect’s Instruction 
 
 
 Clause 25.1 (vi) of the PAM 1998 Form adds a new ground for determination not 
found in the PAM 1969 Form, where the contractor ‘has persistently refused or failed to 
comply with a written instruction from the Architect’. This is consistent with the 
enhanced powers of the architect to ensure quality assurance and continual progress of 
the project.  
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 Clause 25.2 sets out procedure by which the employer is to determine the 
contractor’s employment. The procedure hinges on two mandatory notices which have 
been termed as ‘the architect’s notice’ and ‘the employer’s notice’127. If the contractor 
has committed one or more of these defaults, the architect may issue a notice by 
registered post which must specify the default either by naming it or setting out in full the 
relevant clause. The object of the first notice is to put the contractor on warning and to 
give him an opportunity of remedying his default. Therefore, it is important that the 
notice is explicit. 128 
 
 
 This is then followed up with a second notice (the employer’s notice) which is 
served by the employer. If the architect or any person other than the employer serves the 
notice, it is invalid and ineffective. The effect of a valid employer’s notice is to 
‘forthwith’ (meaning immediately, at once or without delay or interval) determine the 
employment of the contractor under the contract. Furthermore, the architect’s notice must 
clearly specify the default of the contractor. The clause does not empower the architect to 
issue a notice of default based on his opinion but only if the contractor had as a matter of 
fact made a default.129 
 
 
 Under Clause 25.2, the employer is protected if the contractor chooses to stave off 
determination by giving a temporary appearance of compliance. For example, the 
contractor can take apparent steps to remedy the situation on receipt of the first choice, 
and as soon as the time for serving the second notice has passed, abandons his efforts 
thinking that a new series of notices need to be initiated. Clause 25.2 denies any 
opportunity to a negligent or unscrupulous contractor to cease the default and then to 
resume it later.130 
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 Should the contractor admit the default and remedy it, he must ensure that he does 
not repeat it. Repetition of specified default means repetition of a default, within the same 
category out of the six listed in Clauses 25.1(i) to (vi). It need not be an identical default 
but must be of the same kind. Any Repetition of a default of which notice had once been 
validly served does not require a further 14 day notice of default. For example, if the 
contractor default be failing to proceed regularly and diligently, and in response to the 
architect’s notice of default resumes proper working, but subsequently defaults in the 
same respect m the architect need not serve a further notice. In such a case the employer 
can proceed to determine the contractor’s employment under the contract without much 
ado. This seems to be the purpose of the words ‘whether previously repeated or not’ in 
the parenthesis.131 
 
 
 If the contractor adopts the third course and continues his default for 14 days after 
receipt of the architect’s notice (or repeats a default after remedying it ), the employer has 
a further ten days to decided whether to proceed under the clause or otherwise. If the 
decides to terminate the contractor’s employment, he must serve on the contractor a 
determination notice. This should be served by a registered post and is effective from the 
moment the notice is received by contractor and clause 25.4 hitherto applies. 
 
 
 The only way in which a notice of determination validly served can be challenged 
is on the basis that it was served ‘unreasonably or vexatiously’. There is English case law 
on the meaning of this phrase. In JM HILL & Sons Ltd v London Brough of Comden132, 
the English Courts of Appeal expressed the view that the use of the word ‘unreasonably’ 
in this context is meant to protect a party where there is ‘something accidental or purely 
incidental so that the Court could see that [the other party] was taking advantage of the 
other side in circumstances in which, from a business point of view, it would totally 
unfair and almost smacking of sharp practice’. The court also stated that ‘vexatiously’ 
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means without good grounds, merely to cause annoyance or embarrassment or irritation. 
In John Jarvis Ltd v Rockdle Housing Association Ltd133, the same court took the view 
that ‘unreasonably’ is a general term which can include anything which can be 
objectively judged to be unreasonable, while ‘vexatiously’ connotes and ulterior motive 
to oppress or annoy. An example of the latter could be employer, by operation a harsh 
timetable, capitalising on a minor but strict default.134 
 
 
 Because of the seriousness of the consequences of an action under Clause 25.1, it 
is suggested that the strict letter of the clause should be followed. A wrongful or 
otherwise invalid determination of the contractor’s employment would amount to a 
repudiatory breach of the contract by the employer. In particular, the times laid down and 
the contents of the notices should be strictly obverse, and son should the requirement as 
to service by registered post. Indeed , it is recommended that the notices should be served 
by registered post to the address stated in the contract because then, under Clause 2.6 
such notice ‘shall be deemed to served on the Contractor’. 135 
 
 
3.3.7 Contractor Becoming Bankrupt, Etc 
 
 
 Clause 25.3 deals with the position where the contractor is in financial difficulties 
as evidenced by insolvency, for example bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act 1967, and 
related matters like making a composition or arrangement, winding up the order and 
appointment of liquidator or receiver or manager under the Companies Act 1965. As soon 
as one or more of the listed events occurs the contractor’s employment under the contract 
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is automatically determined. Unlike the common law position, the effect is to treat the 
contractor’s  insolvency as breach of contract justifying determination. 136 
 
 
  In a true insolvency position of bankruptcy and liquidation, it is sensible to 
provide for determination as the official assignee or liquidator has the statutory right to 
disclaim contracts137. However, caution must be exercised when a receiver has been 
appointed over the contractor by debenture holders. In law, the receiver is bound by 
existing contracts and cannot disclaim then even if they are unprofitable. The contractor 
company remains in legal existence even though the possession of its undertakings and 
assets are in the hands f the receiver138. As such, it would be very much in the employer’s 
interests for the contractor to continue following the receiver’s appointment. 139 
 
 
 Given the above discussion, the legal validity of Clause 25.3 must be treated with 
some caution. In practice, parties often carry on with their work and payments until the 
one of them by an overt act indicates that the contract is terminated. In general, it is 
unwise for the employer to reply completely on ‘automatic determination’. Even though 
Clause 25 does not specifically require it, the employer who intends to invoke the clause 
should inform the contractor, the official assignee liquidator of his reliance on it. This 
would avoid any claim by the contractor that the employer has waived his rights under 
the clause by allowing the work to continue140. 141 
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3.3.8 Rights and Duties of the Employer and Contractor on Determination of 
Employment of Contractor 
 
 
 After the determination, the contractor’s employment may be reinstated by 
agreement between the employer and, for example, the liquidator. This is in recognition 
of the right of the trustee or liquidator to elect to carry on with the contract or disclaim it. 
There is, however no provision in the clause as to how and when this agreement should 
take place or be recorded. 142 
 
 
 Clause 25.4 contains the provisions which govern the relationship between the 
parties after the contractor’s employment under the contract has been validly determined. 
It refers specifically to the possibility that the employer may be revoke the determination 
and instruct the contractor to continue with the work, although this is unlikely to happen 
in practice. Once the contractor’s employment has been validly determined ‘and so long 
as it has not been reinstated and continued’, the rights and duties of the parties are 
governed by Clause 25.4. 143 
 
 
 Under the PAM/ISM 1969 Form there was no express provision to the effect that 
following determination the contractor must give up possession of the site. Megarry J 
Hounslow London Borough Council v Tivikenham Garden Development Ltd144 refuse an 
injunction whose effect would haven been to exclude the contractor from the site after 
notice of determination. Thus, the contractor was allowed to remain in possession and 
effectively held the employer to ransom by refusing to allow another contractor access to 
the site to complete the work. The decision has been almost universally criticized, 
particularly the court’s reasoning of the existence of an implied negative term by the 
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employer that he would to revoke the contractor’s license to occupy the site while the 
contract period is running.145 
 
 
 The decision was not followed by the Supreme Court of New Zealand in Mayfield 
Holdings v Moana Reef146 where it was suggested that the contractor is bound to give up 
possession, of the site, even if he is disputing the grounds or validity of the 
determination.147  
 
 
 For avoidance of doubt, Clause 25.4(i) requires the contractor to vacate the site 
and return site possession to the employer upon determination. This is to ensure that the 
work in the project is unimpeded. The contractor’s remedy thereafter lies in alternative 
dispute resolution under Clauses 35.0 and 34.0. The employer has the right to engage 
another contractor to carry out and complete the works. 148 
 
 
 Both the employer and the contractor are given an express right under Clause 25.4 
(i) to enter upon the works. The employer is also empowered to purchase all materials 
and goods necessary for the carrying out and completion on the works. The clause also 
allows the employer and persons employed by him use ‘use all temporary buildings, plant, 
tools, equipment, materials and goods that belong to the Contractor intended for an 
delivered to and placed on or adjacent to the works’. This provision can only extend to 
goods, etc. which belong to the contractor in law and cannot confer rights in respect of 
items which belong to third parties149. 
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 Clause 25.4(ii) obliges the contractor, if so required by the employer or the 
architect, to assign to the employer’s benefit any relevant contracts for the supply of 
goods and materials. It also empowers the employer to pay directly any supplier or sub 
contractor for any materials or goods delivered or work done but not already paid for by 
the contractor, and is stated to be in addition to his right under Clause 27.4 to pay 
nominated sub-contractors directly. The employer will find this a valuable right in his 
endeavor to get the work completed. If the employer makes such payments, he has the 
right to deduct them from any sum due or become due to the contractor including from 
the contractor’s retention. 150 
 
 
 Clause 25.4(iii) requires the contractor to remove from the Works ‘any temporary 
buildings, plant, tools, equipments, goods and materials belonging to or hired by him’ 
upon being required in writing to do so by the architect. Since Clause 25.4(i) gives the 
employer the right to use such item for completion of the Works, the contractor will 
presumably only be required to remove them when they are of no further use. It goes on 
to confer on the employer of sale in respect of such items if the contractor fails to comply 
with the architect’s instruction within a ‘reasonable time’. This right is once again 
restricted to those items which are the contractor’s property in law and cannot extend to 
those items hired by him. The employer is exempted from liability for any loss or damage 
to the items should he exercise this power. The employer is to hold ‘the proceeds less all 
costs incurred to the credit of the Contractor’. If the contractor is insolvent, the official 
assignee or a liquidator may require the employer to account for the proceeds in full151. 
 
 
 Clause 25.4(iv) provide for financial settlement following determination. Its effect 
is that the employer may claim any loss he has suffered as a result of the determination 
and to suspend the payment of any money that might be due to the contractor at the date 
of determination until the completion of the matters stated in Clause 25.4(i). He is also 
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relieved of the obligation to make any further payment to the contractor until after the 
completion of the Works and settlement of the account even if the architect has certified 
interim payments which have not been paid to prior to determination. The architect is not 
to issue any further interim payment certificates to the defaulting contractor. Instead he is 
to certify ‘the amount of expenses properly and actually incurred by the Employer and 
the amount of any loss caused to the Employer by the determination’. 
 
 
 Therefore, the final account would be drawn up for the whole of the contract 
Works as if the defaulting contractor had been completed them, including the effects of 
all variation orders, amount of any direct loss and/ or expense payable to the contractor in 
respect of events before the determination, the notional amounts of all nominated sub-
contractors and suppliers accounts as if they had continued with the Works uninterrupted. 
Form this sum must be deducted amounts already paid to the contractor. The balance 
would represent ‘the total amount which would have been payable on completion in 
accordance with this Contract’. 
 
 
 A full account must then be drawn up of all employer’s expenses incurred in 
achieving completion of the contract together with ‘the amount of loss caused to the 
Employer by the determination’. There are three separate elements to be certified by he 
architect: first s expenses as costs of having the work completed, for example, the amount 
payable to there replacement contractor; second is professional fees incurred in 
connection with the completion which would have not otherwise been incurred, for 
example, amount payable to the professionals in drawing up documents, negotiating and 
procuring a replacement contractor to complete the contract and third, any loss by the 
employer (as in section 74 of the Contracts Act 1950); for example, damages for delay in 
completion, costs of insuring the Works before the completion contract is entered into 
salaries of the site staff, emergency work, costs of remedying defects in the original work, 
legal costs, costs of disposing defaulting contract’s plant, loss of use and occupation, site 
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charges which become the employer’s responsibility, payment of additional interests or 
finance charges, liquidated damages, etc. 152 
 
 
As determination under Clause 25.1 is ‘without prejudice to any other rights or 
remedies’ which he may possess, the employer preserves his right to claim liquidated 
damages consequent upon the determination. It is suggested that when the Date for 
Completion of the original contract is reached, whether this is the original date in the 
Appendix or any extended date fixed by the architect, the architect must issue the 
certificate of Non-Completion as the condition precedent to the employer’s right to 
liquidated damages. 153 
 
 
 The final settlement will involve the setting off of the employer’s expenses and 
loss as certified by the architect against the amount payable to the contractor if he had 
completed the work. Clause 25.4(iv) provides that if there is any balance due from the 
employer to the defaulting contractor, it is payable to the contractor if he had completed 
the work. Clause 25.4(iv) provides that if there is any balance due from the employer to 
the defaulting contractor, it is payable as a debt. If, as is usually the case, the sums due to 
the employer exceed those due to the contractor, the balance is recoverable from the 
contractor. The final settlement must take place within a reasonable time of completion. 
154
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
 
 Under both of the PWD 203A and PAM 1998 form of contract, there are almost 
similar defaults listed down which may caused the determination of the contractor’s 
employment. Therefore, the employer has the rights to determinate the contractor’s 
employment if the contractor makes the defaults in one or more of the instances which 
listed down in the contract. Besides that, the procedures and the rights or duties of the 
employer and contractor on determination of contractor are also provided under both of 
the PWD 203A and PAM 1998 form of contract.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
 
DISPUTES ASSOCIATED WITH DETERMINATION OF CONTRACT BY 
EMPLOYER IN CONSTRUCTION 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
 After discuss for the literature part regarding to the determination of contract by 
employer in construction, this chapter will discuss about the objective of this study. 
Therefore, the author will focus on the most frequent disputes associated with the 
determination of contract by employer in construction projects which are referred to the 
court. The court cases referred in this study are those previous court cases which are 
reported under the Malaysia Law Journal.  
 
 
 In the previous chapter, the author had discussed about the determination of 
contract by employer in construction under the PWD 203A and PAM Standard Forms of 
Contract. In both forms of contract, they provide clauses for determination of contract by 
employer. Under the clause, there are listed several defaults by contractors which allowed 
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the employer to determine the contract without prejudice to any rights and remedies 
which he may possess. Therefore, in this chapter, the author will referred to the previous 
court cases and identify the most frequent disputes associated with the determination of 
contract by employer in construction projects which are referred to the court.  
 
 
 The author had sort out all the previous court cases related to the determination of 
construction contract by the employer which reported under the Malaysia Law Journal. 
18 related court cases were selected in this study. Those selected cases will be 
categorized based on the type of disputes associated with the determination of contract by 
employer in construction projects which are referred to the court. The table below shows 
the default of contractors which caused the determination of contract by employer based 
on the clauses provided under PWD 203A and PAM 1998 Form of Contract.  
 
 
PWD 203A Form of Contract PAM 1998 Form of Contract 
Default of Contractors  Clause Default of Contractors  Clause 
 Suspension of Works Cl. 51(a)(i)  Suspension of Works Cl. 25.1 (i) 
 Failure to Proceed Regularly 
and Diligently Cl. 51(a)(ii) 
 Failure to Proceed 
Regularly and Diligently Cl. 25.1 (ii) 
 Failure to Execute Works in 
Accordance with Contract 
or Persistently Neglects to 
Carry Out Contractual 
Obligation 
Cl. 51(a)(iii)  Failure to remove defective 
work Cl. 25.1(iii) 
 Neglect to remove defective 
work Cl. 51(a)(iv) 
 Assignment or Sub-letting 
without Consent Cl. 25.1(iv) 
 Subletting without Consent 
and Failure to Incorporate 
Automatic Determination 
Provision in Sub-contract 
Cl. 51(a)(v)  Abandoned the Contract Cl. 25.1(v) 
 Bankruptcy, Insolvency, etc. 
of the Contractor Cl. 51(b) 
 Persistent Refusal or 
Failure to Comply with An 
Architect’s Instruction  
Cl. 25.1(vi) 
  
 Contractor Becoming 
Bankrupt, Etc Cl. 25.3 
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4.2 Suspension of Works 
 
 
In both of the PWD 203A and PAM standard forms of contract, the suspension of 
works is one of the default of contractor which allowed the employer to determine the 
contractor’s employment.  
 
 
a) Intelek Timur Sdn Bhd v Future Heritage Sdn Bhd155 
 
 
 In this case, the appellant appointed the respondent to undertake the development 
and completion of a low cost housing project by a letter of award dated 16 September 
1996. The letter of award incorporated the PAM Standard Form Agreement, which inter 
alia, contains provisions referring disputes or differences between the parties to 
arbitration. The parties entered into a contract of employment whereby the appellant 
agreed to pay the respondent on progress certificates issued by the appellant's architect 
based on works done by the respondent.  
 
 
In 1997, the parties agreed to have future payments subject to a factoring 
agreement entered between the respondent and one Showa Factoring (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd 
whereby the respondent would submit its invoices (based on the certificates of payment) 
to Showa. The invoices would then be factored and Showa would pay the respondent 
80% of the invoiced amounts with the balance 20% paid, less interest charges, after 
Showa received the invoiced sums from the appellant. Disputes subsequently arose 
between Showa and the appellant as a result of which the respondent was only paid 80% 
of the full amount due under Certificates of Payment No 9 and 10. Due to the non-
payment of the full amount under Certificates of Payment No 9 and 10, the respondent 
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decided to determine the contract by issuing a notice dated 10 December 1997 pursuant 
to cl 26(1)(a) of the contract. Clause 26(1) was subject to a prosviso to the effect that a 
notice of determination should not be given unreasonably or vexatioustly. However, the 
respondent issued a notice of determination dated 19 December 1997 and thereafter 
stopped all works at the construction site.  
 
 
On the other hands, the appellant's architect issued a similar notice dated 24 
December 1997 pursuant to cl 25(i)(a) and/or (b) of the contract alleging that the 
respondent had without reasonable cause defaulted in completing the project. The dispute 
between the appellant and respondent was referred to arbitration. By an award dated 16 
June 2000, the arbitrator, inter alia, dismissed the appellant's claims and allowed the 
respondent's counterclaim. The appellant challenged the arbitrator's award in the High 
Court on the ground that the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct.  The High Court agreed 
with the appellant and set aside the award on the ground that there had been a miscarriage 
of justice. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal which found for the 
respondent and restored the award of the arbitrator.  
 
 
b) JKP Sdn Bhd v PPH Development (M) Sdn Bhd 156 
 
 
 In this case, the plaintiff, the registered proprietor of a piece of land appointed 
Fabina Development Sdn Bhd to develop the said land. Fabina in turn appointed the 
defendant as the main contractor of the housing project pursuant to a construction 
contract. Clause 25(1) of the construction agreement provided that if the defendant shall 
commit a default under the agreement, the architect may give to the defendant a notice by 
registered post or by recorded delivery specifying the default. If the defendant were to 
continue such default for 14 days after receipt of such notice or repeat such default, 
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Fabina may within ten days after such continuance or repetition forthwith determine the 
contract.  
 
 
The defendant had completed 90-95% of the said project but subsequently 
stopped further work on the basis that Fabina was not paying its dues on time. Fabina 
then terminated the construction contract due to the suspension of the works by the 
defendant. 
 
 
c) Lim Chon Beng v Pulau Kembar Sdn Bhd 157 
 
 
 The plaintiff purchased a shop lot from the defendant, a housing developer, at a 
price of RM590,800. Pursuant to cl 19(b)(i) of the agreement, the defendant was required 
to complete the construction and deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff within 
48 months from a date, a certain 'condition precedent' was satisfied. Till present, the 
defendant had still not completed the construction of the property despite the fact that the 
plaintiff as at 10 June 1999 had paid to the defendant a total sum of RM295,400 as 
progress payments towards the purchase price together with late payment interest of 
RM467.80 pursuant to cl 6.  
 
 
Despite numerous enquiries, the plaintiff was unable to obtain any satisfactory 
response from the defendant as to when the property would be delivered to the plaintiff 
and as to whether he could claim liquidated damages for the defendant's late completion. 
This led to the plaintiff sending through his solicitors a written enquiry dated 6 May 2002. 
Receiving no response from the defendant, the plaintiff sent a written notice dated 28 
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May 2002 requiring the defendant to deliver possession of the property by 31 July 2002, 
failing which the plaintiff would terminate the agreement and commence legal 
proceedings against the defendant. The defendant denied having received this notice. 
Receiving no reply from the defendant, the plaintiff eventually by written notice dated 9 
June 2003 informed the defendant that the agreement was deemed terminated through the 
defendant's own repudiation. The defendant again denied receiving this notice.  
 
 
d) Majlis Perbandaran Seremban v Maraputra Sdn Bhd 158 
 
 
The applicant is the local authority responsible for the municipal of Seremban, 
Negeri Sembilan. Some time in 1989, the applicant appointed the respondent as the main 
contractor to carry out three of the packages of Stage 1 of the Seremban Sewerage Project 
under three separate contracts ('Contract 101', 'Contract 106' and 'Contract 110'). The 
Contracts were all on the PWD Form 203A standard form of contract. In respect of 
Packages 101 and 110 the contract works were completed, but there were contractual 
claims arising therefrom. These were disputed by the applicant.  
 
 
In respect of Package 106, the respondent suspended works on 22 January 1993 
after having earlier given notice in December 1992 claiming that it was entitled to do so 
unless it was paid for various contractual claims. These claims are also disputed by the 
applicant. The disputes under the three Contracts were referred to arbitration, and the 
parties agreed to appoint an Arbitrator to determine the Disputes.  
 
 
In March 1995 an agreement in writing was entered into to mutually terminate the 
Contract in respect of Package 106 on terms preserving the parties' rights to revolve the 
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remaining part of the Disputes in the arbitration. The Arbitrator then convened a 
preliminary meeting to give directions. Pursuant to these directions, the respondent filed 
its points of claim, the applicant its defence and counterclaim and the respondent its reply 
and defence to counterclaim. The arbitral hearing commenced on 18 October 1999 after 
preliminary matters had been dealt with in prior preliminary meetings. The arbitral 
hearing was only on liability as agreed to by the parties. This hearing resulted in an 
Award on Liability dated 8 June 2001 ('the Award'), after evidence had been taken and 
submissions (written and elaborated on orally) made by the parties. The applicant sought 
to set aside the Award given by the learned Arbitrator.  
 
 
e) Pekeliling Triangle Sdn Bhd & Anor v Chase Perdana Bhd 159 
 
 
Under a contract made between the first defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff 
was employed to construct a commercial and apartment complex in Kuala Lumpur 
known as the 'Marinara' building. It was a lump sum contract in the value of RM110m. 
The payment was guaranteed by an irrevocable bank guarantee of RM122.77m issued by 
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd in favor of the plaintiff. Payment under the bank 
guarantee would be made upon the issuance of the certificate of practical completion by 
the architect of the building ('the second defendant'). The date for completion stipulated 
by the contract was 15 September 1997 but the plaintiff failed to meet the target date for 
completion and the date for completion was extended from time to time, the last of which 
was March 2000.  
 
 
The first defendant alleged that at the end of the last date for completion there was 
continuing default on the part of the plaintiff. After the issuance of notices by the second 
defendant and the consulting engineer specifying the major shortcomings, the plaintiff 
proceeded to remedy the same. The first and second defendants were not satisfied with 
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the remedial works done by the plaintiff and the second defendant refused to issue the 
CPC. As such, the plaintiff was not able to claim payment under the bank guarantee. On 
14 June 2000, the third defendant under the purported authority of the first defendant 
entered the building site with uniform guards, some of whom were armed with shotguns. 
The plaintiff then filed a writ action against the defendants based on trespass and 
conspiracy to injure the plaintiff's legitimate rights and interests under the contract. 
 
 
f) SK Styrofoam Sdn Bhd v Pembinaan LCL Sdn Bhd 160 
 
 
In this case, the applicant applied to set aside certain parts of the Final Award and 
to vary certain findings of the arbitrator. The respondent stopped work from 24 April 
1998 right up to the determination of the contract on 21 May 1998, a period of 26 days. 
The arbitrator had also held that the respondent had made an offer for reasonable 
completion of the contract by 30 March 1998. The arbitrator also accepts from his 
rendering of the facts that there was a default notice dated 25 April 1998 from the 
architect warning of termination but of course does not accept its validity pursuant to cl 
25. It is also undisputed that there was another notice on 5 May 1998 (after 12 days of 
continued stoppage of work) again warning of intent to determine if the stoppage 
continued.  The applicant also sought to remit certain issues to the reconsideration of the 
arbitrator.  
 
 
One of the issues of this case is whether the contractor is just temporary stop the 
work. The correct question that ought to have been posed and answered by the arbitrator 
was, 'On the facts of the case, had the respondent wholly suspended work? If so, was it 
done because of physical impossibility or a hindrance to doing work'. The respondent has 
not shown any evidence of a physical impossibility or hindrance to justify suspension. 
The contract itself contemplated that the employer could determine the contract for a 
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suspension of work without reasonable cause that continued for 14 days after a warning. 
Such conduct clearly was a breach that was sufficiently fundamental to justify the 
determination of the contract in common law. The determination of the contract by the 
applicant was valid in both contract and common law and therefore the determination by 
the arbitrator was set aside. 
 
 
g) Usaha Damai Sdn Bhd v Setiausaha Kerajaan Selangor 161 
 
 
Pursuant to a formal contract with the respondent, the applicant agreed to 
construct a specified number of low-cost houses and shop houses for a housing project at 
a cost of RM2,832,000 on the basis of target cost plus. As the respondent's estimate of the 
cost of construction was below the actual cost of construction, the applicant then wrote to 
appeal to the respondent to revise upwards the cost of construction but received no 
response from the respondent. Notwithstanding that, the applicant proceeded with the 
task of constructing the project. Due to financial hardship, the applicant stopped work. 
Consequently, the respondent terminated the contract. Pursuant to the contract, the parties 
referred their dispute to an arbitrator. 
 
 
The applicant claimed damages for wrongful determination of the contract or 
alternatively quantum meruit in the sum of RM122,304.04 for the works completed. The 
arbitrator, however, inter alia, found that the applicant had no reasonable cause to 
suspend work, that the determination of the contract was lawful and consequently 
rejected the applicant's claim. The applicant, being dissatisfied with the arbitrator's award, 
applied to the court to set aside the award on the ground that the arbitrator had 
misconducted himself in coming to a conclusion that was at total variance with his own 
findings of fact. It was contended on behalf of the applicant that the wide discrepancy 
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between the applicant's estimate of the cost of construction and that of the respondent, the 
latter's refusal to revise upwards the cost of the construction and the delay in payment 
constituted reasonable cause on its part to suspend the works and that the failure of the 
arbitrator to consider them after having found that the parties intended the contract to be a 
target cost plus contract, had gone to vitiate the award, which therefore ought to be set 
aside. However, the court held that the applicant dismiss the application. 
 
 
h) Vistanet (M) Sdn Bhd v Pilecon Civil Works Sdn Bhd 162 
 
 
 The plaintiff was appointed by the proprietor and developer, Mayland Boulevard 
Sdn Bhd as the main contractor for the construction of a project of service apartments. By 
an agreement via a letter of acceptance, the plaintiff had appointed the defendant to 
construct and complete the project. The defendant delayed and suspended work with no 
credible assurance as to when the defendant would complete the project. By this, the 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant had breached cl 25.1(i) of the Pertubuhan Akitek 
Malaysia (PAM) contract by stopping work, delayed the completion of the project and 
failed to adhere to the work programme. The plaintiff had also determined the defendant's 
employment to seek another contractor to complete the remaining works.  
 
 
 The defendant then removed those properties belonging to them at site and 
disputed as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to terminate the letter of acceptance and 
whether the PAM contract was applicable. The plaintiff sought for, inter alia: (a) a 
mandatory injunction that the defendant give possession of the site to the plaintiff; (b) a 
mandatory injunction that the defendant leave the site immediately; (c) a prohibitory 
injunction that the defendant be prevented from entering the site; (d) a mandatory 
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injunction that the defendant returned all properties unlawfully removed from the site to 
the plaintiff. In this case, the applications are allowed.  
 
 
4.2.1 Review of the Disputes Caused by Suspension of Works 
 
 
Above are those cases related to the determination of contract by employer in 
construction projects due to the suspension of works by contractor which are referred to 
the court. There are 8 cases referred to the court due to the suspension of works which are 
reported under the Malaysia Law Journal. More than half of the 8 cases discussed above 
show the suspension of works by contractors due to dissatisfaction with the payment by 
the employer. The contractors suspended the works and claimed that they will continue 
the works unless the employers pay the contractors on time and satisfied them.  
 
 
Besides the reasons of dissatisfaction with payment, some of the cases above are 
caused by the defaults of the contractors themselves. The contractors cannot complete the 
works on time and suspends the works with unreasonable reason. Therefore, the 
employers choose to determinate the contractor’s employment pursuant to suspension of 
works by contractor.  
 
 
 
 
4.3 Failure to Proceed Regularly and Diligently 
 
 
 This default is a breach of the contractor’s obligation after obtaining possession of 
the site. It must be noted that failure to proceed regularly and diligently with the works is 
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one of the grounds in which may lead to determination of the contractor’s employment. It 
is a most difficult ground to establish in practice, and essential it is a question of fact. 
 
 
a) Fajar Menyensing Sdn Bhd v Angsana Sdn Bhd 163 
 
 
The plaintiff as the contractor and the defendant as the employer had entered into 
a standard building contract for the construction of a housing scheme. The defendant's 
architect by way of a letter dated 19 July 1988 gave notice that in the architect's opinion, 
the plaintiff had failed to proceed regularly and diligently in execution of the works. The 
notice was hand delivered to the plaintiff. By a subsequent letter dated 11 August 1988, a 
fresh notice was issued to the plaintiff requesting that the plaintiff proceed regularly and 
diligently with the works. This was also delivered by hand to the plaintiff. Finally, by a 
letter dated 30 August 1988, which was delivered by hand and received by the plaintiff, 
the defendant gave notice of termination of the contract. The matter then proceeded to 
arbitration.  
 
 
The arbitrator, pursuant to s 22(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act 1952 referred two 
questions by way of case stated for determination by the High Court. The issues were 
whether: (i) the notices of determination by both the defendant and its architect were 
invalid because they were delivered by hand rather than in accordance with the 
provisions of cl 25(1) of the contract (which provided for notices of determination to be 
given by registered post or recorded delivery); and (ii) the notices of determination were 
invalid as they were based merely on the architect's opinion or relied upon the same as 
the basis for determination. 
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b) Kokomewah Sdn Bhd v Desa Hatchery Sdn Bhd 164 
 
 
 The defendant had appointed the plaintiff to construct a chicken farm project in 
Labuan for a fee of 15% of the total cost of the project which was budgeted at RM37m. 
The parties executed a contract dated 16 November 1983 but negotiations continued and 
resulted in the execution of another contract in May 1984. Disputes later arose and the 
progress of the construction works was not satisfactory. An independent quantity 
surveyor was appointed to resolve the disputes, followed by three meetings. At the end of 
the second meeting, a document called the 'Final summary' was initialled by the plaintiff's 
representative and the quantity surveyor, containing an increased contract sum which the 
plaintiff contended was a concluded amount, but this was disputed by the defendant. 
Subsequently, a letter of intent was sent by the defendant to the plaintiff confirming the 
decisions reached at the meetings. On 12 June 1985, notices to speed up the work and to 
remove and rectify various defective works were given by the defendant to the plaintiff. 
The defendant subsequently terminated the contract through a letter dated 4 July 1985. 
  
  
 The plaintiff alleged wrongful termination and claimed damages of: (a) 
RM13,818,693 under the letter of intent which it alleged was a concluded new contract 
but which the defendant denied; or (b) alternatively, for RM7,533,658.74 under the 1984 
contract which the defendant maintained was still in force at the time the notice of 
termination was given. The defendant counterclaimed for costs of rectification and 
completion of defective works. 
  
 
 
                                                 
164
 [1995] 1 MLJ 214 
  
79 
 
c) Kong Wah Housing Development Sdn Bhd V Desplan Construction Trading 
Sdn Bhd 165 
  
 
 The defendant was engaged by the plaintiff as contractors for the construction of a 
housing project at Taman Sinaran, Daerah Ulu Kinta, Perak under a contract in writing 
dated 1 August 1990 incorporating the Pertubuhan Akitek Malaysia Conditions of 
Contract. The contract price was approximately RM4.2m. Clause 21(1) of the conditions 
gave exclusive possession of the site to the plaintiff, while cl 25(1) provided for the 
determination of the defendant's employment under the contract in the event of specified 
defaults. By cl 34(1) of the conditions, disputes between the parties were referable to 
arbitration. 
  
 
 On 17 December 1990, the architect wrote to the defendant as regards its 
'abnormally slow' progress and giving notice of the plaintiff's rights to determine the 
contract if the slow progress persisted. Subsequently, the plaintiff terminated the 
defendant's employment under the contract by a solicitor's letter dated 7 January 1991. 
On 19 January 1991, the plaintiff was granted an injunction restraining the defendant, its 
directors, servants, agents or otherwise, from entering and/or remaining and/or occupying 
and/or trespassing on the site and from obstructing and/or disrupting the plaintiff's 
endeavors to develop the site. The defendant's subsequent application to strike out the 
proceedings or set aside the injunction was dismissed, but the proceedings were stayed 
pending arbitration. 
  
 
 The defendant appealed on the ground that the injunction ought not to have been 
granted before the dispute between the parties had been resolved, that the plaintiff had 
                                                 
165
 [1991] 3 MLJ 269 
  
80 
 
not acted properly, that it was difficult to assess the amount of work completed by the 
defendant when the injunction was granted and that the injunction should be stayed since 
it was not a proper remedy as the matter should go to arbitration. 
 
 
d) Loke Hong Kee (S) PTE Limited v United Overseas Land Limited 166 
 
 
 In this case the parties had entered into a written agreement under which the 
appellant agreed to carry out and complete building works under the supervision and to 
the satisfaction of the respondents' architect. The dispute in this case arose out of a 
written agreement dated April 8, 1974 between the parties.  
 
 
 By a supplemental agreement of March 23, 1976 made between the parties, the 
respondents were "at liberty to determine the employment of the appellants under the 
main contract forthwith by notice in writing" upon the recommendation of the architect in 
writing should he be of the opinion that the respondent had failed to maintain the 
progress of works as specified in the schedule to the agreement. On March 1, 1977 the 
architect, pursuant to the said provisions by a letter to the respondents recommended the 
determination of employment of the appellants under the main contract. The appellants 
were not, in his opinion, carrying out the works expeditiously and with every diligence. 
By a letter of March 1, 1977 the respondent determined the appellants' employment under 
the main contract forthwith. Disputes having arisen between the parties the matter were 
referred to arbitration before a single arbitrator. In this case, the appellants appealed to 
the Privy Council. 
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e)  Malayan Flour Mills Sdn Bhd v Raja Lope & Tan Co & Anor 167 
 
 
 The applicant and the respondent were parties to a standard form contract for 
some civil and building works. When the engineer found the respondent's progress on site 
to be unsatisfactory, two warning letters were sent. Subsequently under cl 63 of the 
conditions of contract, the engineer certified that the respondent was not executing works 
in accordance with the contract and was persistently neglecting to carry out its 
obligations under the contract. On 2 August 1989, the applicant pursuant to cl 63 of the 
contract issued a termination notice to the respondent, thus terminating the contract.  
 
 
 The respondent disputed the validity of the termination and at arbitration. The 
arbitrator found that the termination notice was premature and therefore invalid. The 
arbitrator also decided in his award that since the applicant had exercised its contractual 
rights, it could not resort to the remedy of termination under common law. The applicant 
argued that the arbitrator had misconducted himself in so deciding and applied for the 
award to be set aside. The key issue to be decided by the court was whether having 
exercised its contractual rights, the applicant could resort to the remedy of termination 
under common law. 
 
 
f) Official Assignee v Chartered Industries of Singapore Ltd168 
 
 
 In this case contractors (who later became bankrupt) had contracted to construct a 
building for the respondents. The building contract provided that if the contractors failed 
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to proceed with the works with reasonable diligence the respondents could terminate the 
contract. The respondents purported to terminate the contract but the contractors disputed 
the validity of the termination. The parties agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration 
and appointed one Albert Hung Hin Kay as arbitrator. The contractors claimed that the 
agreement was wrongfully terminated and claimed damages in the sum of $ 415,567.44 
while the respondents claimed that it was lawfully terminated and counterclaimed for the 
sum of $ 154,431.49. The arbitrator after hearing the parties made an award that the 
respondents had a valid and just claim for$ 154,431.49 and that the contractors did not 
have a valid and just claim for "$ 415,567.44 or any sum at all." The official assignee 
applied to have the arbitration set aside or to have the matter referred back to the 
arbitrator. 
 
 
g) Petowa Jaya Sdn Bhd v Binaan Nasional Sdn Bhd 169 
 
 
 In this case, the plaintiff was the sub-contractor for certain roadworks. The 
defendant was the main contractor who sub-contracted the work to the plaintiff. The 
consideration for the defendant sub-contracting the works to the plaintiff was 2% of all 
payment received for value of work carried out by the plaintiff, with the plaintiff taking 
98% of the same. 
 
 
 Thereafter the defendant wrote to the plaintiff and terminated the contract 
between them. The main complaint of the defendant was that the work was not done 
diligently and regularly. The plaintiff, inter alia, sought a Mareva injunction. 
 
                                                 
169
 [1988] 2 MLJ 261 
  
83 
 
h) Tai Wah Construction Co v Government of Malaysia (Jabatan Kerja Raya 
Sarawak) 170 
 
 
 The respondent and the appellant entered into a contract whereby the latter was 
appointed by the former to construct and complete the building of a school. Subsequently 
a dispute arose between the parties arising from the slow progress of the appellant in 
carrying out the works at hand. It finally culminated with the respondent terminating the 
said contract vide letter dated 5 November 1990. The respondent also alleged that as a 
result of the appellant's failure to proceed diligently with the works, the appellant had by 
its own accord repudiated the said contract.  
 
 
 In view of the dispute and pursuant to cl 43 of the Sarawak Public Works 
Department's 'General Conditions of Contract' which formed part of the said contract, the 
parties agreed to refer the matter for arbitration. Both parties agreed to refer two issues 
for the determination of the arbitrator: (i) whether the determination of the said contract 
was lawful under the GCC or at common law in the circumstances of the facts of the case; 
and (ii) whether the losses and damages claimed in the circumstances of the case are 
claimable in law and in fact. The arbitrator concluded that: (a) that the determination of 
the said contract was not lawful and directed the respondent to pay the appellant total 
sum of RM64,998.26 as full satisfaction of the appellant's claim. The arbitrator also did 
not allow other claims of the appellant like indemnity for performance bond and similarly 
found that the respondent was not entitled to the sums claimed in its counter claim. The 
appellant filed for an order before the High Court to have the arbitrator's award be 
remitted or set aside on the ground that the award 'on the face thereof is bad in law'. No 
formal application was made by the respondent but they too wanted the award to be 
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remitted to the arbitrator for reconsideration. The trial judge dismissed the application 
and hence, this appeal. 
 
 
i) Intelek Timur Sdn Bhd v Future Heritage Sdn Bhd 171 
  
 
 In this case, it was discussed before at the default of suspension works by the 
contractor. The appellant appointed the respondent to undertake the development and 
completion of a low cost housing project. However, the appellant's architect issued a 
notice of determination pursuant to cl 25(i)(a) and/or (b) of the contract alleging that the 
respondent had without reasonable cause defaulted in completing the project. 
 
 
4.3.1 Review of the Disputes Caused by Failure to Proceed Regularly and 
Diligently 
 
 
After discuss all the cases related to the disputes caused by failure to proceed 
regularly and diligently, found that this defaults of the contractors is the most frequent 
disputes associated with the determination of contract by employer which referred to the 
court. Most of the cases above focus on the contractors’ progress of works on site which 
are not satisfied and slow. Besides that, the contractors also breach of the express 
obligation of the contractor under the clause provided in the contract to proceed 
‘regularly and diligently’ with the works after being given possession of the site. The 
contractor will breach the contract if they still failed to maintain the progress of works as 
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specified in the schedule to the agreement and the Superintending Officer not satisfied 
their progress of works on site.  
 
 
 
 
4.4 Failure to Remove Defective Work  
 
 
 The architect is given specific power to instruct that defective work be remedied. 
A valid instruction or notice must be issued before this ground for determination can be 
invoked. There must be either an outright refusal and/or a persistent neglect by the 
contractor to comply with its terms. Persistence suggests that there must have been 
reminders which have been ignored by the contractor. It cannot be said to be persistent if 
the contractor had simply failed to comply with a written instruction without a 
reminder.172 
 
 
a) Kokomewah Sdn Bhd v Desa Hatchery Sdn Bhd 173 
 
 
 This case was discussed previously under the default of failure to proceed 
regularly and diligently. The defendant had appointed the plaintiff to construct a chicken 
farm project in Labuan for a fee of 15% of the total cost of the project which was 
budgeted at RM37m. Disputes later arose and the progress of the construction works was 
not satisfactory. On 12 June 1985, notices to speed up the work and to remove and rectify 
various defective works were given by the defendant to the plaintiff. The defendant 
subsequently terminated the contract through a letter dated 4 July 1985. 
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b) Pekeliling Triangle Sdn Bhd & Anor v Chase Perdana Bhd 174 
 
 
This case was also discussed previously under the default of suspended the works 
by contractor. Under a contract made between the first defendant and the plaintiff, the 
plaintiff was employed to construct a commercial and apartment complex in Kuala 
Lumpur known as the 'Marinara' building. The date for completion stipulated by the 
contract was 15 September 1997 but the plaintiff failed to meet the target date for 
completion and the date for completion was extended from time to time, the last of which 
was March 2000.  
 
 
The first defendant alleged that at the end of the last date for completion there was 
continuing default on the part of the plaintiff. After the issuance of notices by the second 
defendant and the consulting engineer specifying the major shortcomings, the plaintiff 
proceeded to remedy the same. The first and second defendants were not satisfied with 
the remedial works done by the plaintiff and the second defendant refused to issue the 
CPC.  
 
 
c) Tan Tong Meng (PTE) LTD v Artic Builders & Co (PTE) Ltd 175 
 
 
 By a written agreement dated November 15, 1975, the defendants agreed to erect 
and complete for the plaintiff a 19-storey apartment block. Clause 25(1) of the said 
agreement provided for the determination of the contract by the employer, i.e. the 
plaintiffs. On May 17, 1978 the plaintiffs' architects wrote to the defendants indicating 
dissatisfaction with the defendants' work and instructing the defendants to attend to 
certain defects in the building. On June 2, 1978, the plaintiffs' solicitors wrote the 
                                                 
174
 [2003] 1 MLJ 130 
175
 [1986] 2 MLJ 241 
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defendants' solicitors claiming damages for delay and terminating the contract forthwith. 
Reference was made to Clause 25(1).  
 
 
 The dispute was then referred to a single arbitrator who made an Interim award on 
May 9, 1979. The plaintiffs sought to set aside, vary or remit to the Arbitrator the Interim 
Award on 5 grounds. The plaintiffs contended, inter alia, that the interim award did not 
deal with all the matters referred to by the Arbitrator for his decision. The remission went 
to the Arbitrator and he published his Findings pursuant to Order of Court of March 4, 
1980. The plaintiffs then filed another Originating Motion to set aside, vary or remit the 
Interim Award as amplified by the Arbitrator's said Findings. The High Court set aside 
the award but the decision of the High Court was reversed by the Court of Appeal. The 
appellant appealed. 
 
 
4.4.1 Review of the Disputes Caused by Failure to Remove Defective Works 
 
 
There are 3 cases discussed above regarding to the disputes caused by failure to 
remove defective works which referred to the court. Those cases having the similar 
situation where the contractor failed to proceed satisfied works and failed to remove the 
defective works instructed by the Superintending Officer or Architect. Under the contract, 
the architect is given specific power to instruct that defective work be remedied. 
Therefore, after the valid instruction or notice issued by the Architect, the contractor still 
remains the same, it can be said that the contractor has breach of the contract. Hence, the 
determination of contractor’s employment is valid.  
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4.5 Assignment or Sub-letting without Consent; Failure to Execute Works in 
Accordance with Contract; Bankruptcy, Insolvency, etc. of the Contractor 
 
 
 After sort out all the previous court cases which related to the determination of 
contract by employer, found that there are no cases reported under Malaysia Law Journal 
regarding to the defaults of contractor where they assignment or sub-letting without 
consent; failure to execute works in accordance with contract; and bankruptcy, 
insolvency, etc. of the contractor. It is surprised that there are no any cases reported under 
those defaults. Therefore, we can notice that the determination of contractor’s 
employment is seldom caused by the contractor assignment or sub-letting their works 
without employer’s consent; failure to execute works in accordance with contract and 
also caused by bankruptcy of the contractor.  
 
 
 Furthermore, according to Sundra Rajoo, at first sight of the default of contractor 
assignment or sub-letting without consent, it would seem to be a severe remedy. However, 
the contractor is safeguarded in three ways: firstly, the employer’s consent cannot be 
‘unreasonable withheld’; secondly, the contractor must have failed to comply for 14 days 
and; thirdly, the determination by the employer must not be ‘unreasonable and vexations’. 
Assignment or sub-letting in themselves would not be necessarily be causes for 
determining at common law. However, it may give rise to a claim for nominal 
damages176.177 Therefore, this may caused the default of contractor assignment or sub-
letting without consent is not one of the frequent issues under the determination of 
contractors’ employment.  
 
 
 For the bankruptcy and insolvency of contractor, according to the contract, it also 
deals with the position where the contractor is in financial difficulties as evidenced by 
                                                 
176
 See Thomas Feather & Co (Bradford) Ltd v Keighley Corporation [1953] 52 Local Government Reports 
30.  
177
 Sundra Rajoo. (1999). Ibid. Pg 251 
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insolvency, for example bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act 1967, and related matters 
like making a composition or arrangement, winding up the order and appointment of 
liquidator or receiver or manager under the Companies Act 1965. As soon as one or more 
of the listed events occurs the contractor’s employment under the contract is 
automatically determined. However, in practice, parties often carry on with their work 
and payments until the one of them by an overt act indicates that the contract is 
terminated. In general, it is unwise for the employer to reply completely on ‘automatic 
determination’. Even though Clause 25 under PAM form of contract does not specifically 
require it, the employer who intends to invoke the clause should inform the contractor, 
the official assignee liquidator of his reliance on it. This would avoid any claim by the 
contractor that the employer has waived his rights under the clause by allowing the work 
to continue178. 179 
 
 
 
 
4.6 Others Dispute Caused the Determination of Contract by Employer 
 
 
 Besides those defaults by the contractor which listed in the standard form of 
contract will caused the contract determined by the employer, there are also previous 
court cases which the employer determinate the contractor’s employment due to other 
reasons. Below is the case which referred to the court regarding to the determination of 
contract by employer due to other reasons which not listed down in the contract.  
 
 
 
                                                 
178
 See Farley v Housing & Commercial Devlopments Ltd (1984) 26 BLR 66 ;Willment Brothers Ltd v 
North-West Thames Regional Helth Authority (1984) 26 BLR 51 
179
 Sundra Rajoo. (1999). Ibid. Pg 255 
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a) Highceed Corp Sdn Bhd v Warisan Harta Sabah Sdn Bhd & Anor 180 
 
 
 The first defendant had appointed the plaintiff as a contractor to carry out the 
construction of a commercial building complex and a building contract was signed. The 
plaintiff also procured a performance bond in favour of the first defendant issued by the 
second defendant and took out an Insurance Guarantee against Advance Payment issued 
by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant. The plaintiff then took 
possession of the site. By a letter dated 26 January 1998, the first defendant indicated to 
the plaintiff its intention of either to extend the period of completion of the project or to 
stop work and to compensate the plaintiff for the costs it had incurred so far. Then by a 
letter dated 16 July 1998, the project consultant, M/s Arkitek Ikhtisas Sdn Bhd instructed 
the plaintiff to stop work immediately.  
 
 
 In response to the stop work order, the plaintiff informed the project consultant of 
its decision to treat the building contract as 'having been determined' by the first 
defendant. It also gave notice of its intention to submit its claim for all losses and 
damages suffered by it by reason of the termination. By a letter dated 8 October 1998 to 
the plaintiff, the first defendant wrote, inter alia, that the stop work order was of a 
permanent nature. By its letter dated 31 December 1998, the plaintiff submitted its claim 
for the works done as directed in the stop work order. The plaintiff then applied for 
summary judgments against the defendants. The issues were, inter alia: (i) whether the 
stop work order repudiated the building contract; (ii) whether the first defendant can rely 
on an implied term/cl 11 of the building contract that in the event of any financial or 
economic crisis happening, the first defendant should be entitled to terminate the 
plaintiff's employment; and (iii) whether the doctrine of frustration applies. 
 
                                                 
180
 [1986] 2 MLJ 241 
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 In this case, the court allowed the plaintiff’s application and held that a stop work 
order issued by the first defendant effectively repudiated the building contract as the first 
defendant in no uncertain term made it clear that the stop work order would be of a 
permanent nature. There is no specific provision in the building contract relating to 
economic downturn as a reason for an issuance of a stop work order. It is also not 
specifically stated as one of the grounds for terminating the building contract. The court 
could not infer that the parties to the building contract must have intended to include 
economic downturn as a factor that could be a basis for the repudiation of the building 
contract. Hence, the reliance on implied term principled by the first defendant as a 
justification in the issuance of the stop work order fails and the court finds no triable 
issue arising thereof. 
 
 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
 
 After discuss all the related previous related court cases reported under the 
Malaysia Law Journal, we found that the most frequent disputes associated with the 
determination of contract by employer in construction projects which referred to the court 
are the failure to proceed regularly and diligently; follow by suspension of works by 
contractor, and also the failure to remove defective works. On the other hand, no previous 
court cases were found where the determination of contract caused by other defaults 
listed under the contract.  
 
 
 The most frequent reason that caused the determination of the contractors’ 
employment is the employers not satisfied with the work progress of the contractor on 
site.  Therefore, if the contractors who fail to proceed their works regularly and diligently, 
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the employers have the rights to determinate the contract pursuant to the clauses provided 
in the main contract. Contractors should plan and maintain their work progress according 
to the schedule which has set up earlier.  
 
 
 The table below shows the summary of the selected court cases according to their 
disputes associated with the determination of contract by employer in construction 
project.  
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Disputes Associated with the Determination of Contract By Employer in Construction 
Project. 
No List of Selected Cases 
Suspension 
of Works 
Failure to 
Proceed 
Regularly 
and 
Diligently 
Failure to 
Remove 
Defective 
Works 
Assignment 
or Sub-letting 
without 
Consent 
Failure to 
Execute 
Works in 
Accordance 
with Contract 
Bankruptcy, 
Insolvency, 
etc. of the 
Contractor 
Others 
1 
Fajar Menyensing Sdn Bhd v 
Angsana Sdn Bhd181 
 √      
2 
Highceed Corp Sdn Bhd v Warisan 
Harta Sabah Sdn Bhd & Anor 182 
      √ 
3 
Intelek Timur Sdn Bhd v Future 
Heritage Sdn Bhd183 
√ √      
4 
JKP Sdn Bhd v PPH Development 
(M) Sdn Bhd 184 
√       
5 
Kokomewah Sdn Bhd v Desa 
Hatchery Sdn Bhd 185 
 √ √     
                                                 
181
 [1998] 6 MLJ 80 
182
 [1986] 2 MLJ 241 
183
 [2004] 1 MLJ 401 
184
 [2003] 6 MLJ 192 
185
 [1995] 1 MLJ 214 
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Disputes Associated with the Determination of Contract By Employer in Construction 
Project. 
No List of Selected Cases 
Suspension 
of Works 
Failure to 
Proceed 
Regularly 
and 
Diligently 
Failure to 
Remove 
Defective 
Works 
Assignment 
or Sub-letting 
without 
Consent 
Failure to 
Execute 
Works in 
Accordance 
with Contract 
Bankruptcy, 
Insolvency, 
etc. of the 
Contractor 
Others 
6 
Kong Wah Housing Development 
Sdn Bhd V Desplan Construction 
Trading Sdn Bhd 186 
 √      
7 
Lim Chon Beng v Pulau Kembar 
Sdn Bhd 187 
√       
8 
Loke Hong Kee (S) PTE Limited v 
United Overseas Land Limited 188 
 √      
9 
Majlis Perbandaran Seremban v 
Maraputra Sdn Bhd 189 
√       
10 
Malayan Flour Mills Sdn Bhd v 
Raja Lope & Tan Co & Anor 190  √      
                                                 
186
 [1991] 3 MLJ 269 
187
 [2005] 7 MLJ 180 
188
 [1982] 2 MLJ 83 
189
 [2004] 5 MLJ 469 
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Disputes Associated with the Determination of Contract By Employer in Construction 
Project. 
No List of Selected Cases 
Suspension 
of Works 
Failure to 
Proceed 
Regularly 
and 
Diligently 
Failure to 
Remove 
Defective 
Works 
Assignment 
or Sub-letting 
without 
Consent 
Failure to 
Execute 
Works in 
Accordance 
with Contract 
Bankruptcy, 
Insolvency, 
etc. of the 
Contractor 
Others 
11 
Official Assignee v Chartered 
Industries of Singapore Ltd 191  √      
12 
Pekeliling Triangle Sdn Bhd & 
Anor v Chase Perdana Bhd 192 
√  √     
13 
Petowa Jaya Sdn Bhd v Binaan 
Nasional Sdn Bhd 193 
 √      
14 
SK Styrofoam Sdn Bhd v 
Pembinaan LCL Sdn Bhd 194 
√       
15 
Tan Tong Meng (PTE) LTD v Artic 
Builders & Co (PTE) Ltd 195 
  √     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
190
 [1998] 6 MLJ 377 
191
 [1978] 2 MLJ 99 
192
 [2003] 1 MLJ 130 
193
 [1988] 2 MLJ 261 
194
 [2004] 5 MLJ 385 
195
 [1986] 2 MLJ 241 
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Disputes Associated with the Determination of Contract By Employer in Construction 
Project. 
No List of Selected Cases 
Suspension 
of Works 
Failure to 
Proceed 
Regularly 
and 
Diligently 
Failure to 
Remove 
Defective 
Works 
Assignment 
or Sub-letting 
without 
Consent 
Failure to 
Execute 
Works in 
Accordance 
with Contract 
Bankruptcy, 
Insolvency, 
etc. of the 
Contractor 
Others 
16 
Tai Wah Construction Co v 
Government of Malaysia (JKR 
Sarawak) 196 
 √      
17 
Usaha Damai Sdn Bhd v 
Setiausaha Kerajaan Selangor 197 
√       
18 
Vistanet (M) Sdn Bhd v Pilecon 
Civil Works Sdn Bhd 198 
√       
 Total of Cases : 8 9 3 0 0 0 1 
 
 
 
                                                 
196
 [2005] 2 MLJ 442 
197
 [1997] 5 MLJ 601 
198
 [2005] 6 MLJ 664 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
A contract creates a legal obligation upon the contracting parties. The discharge 
of a contract means when the parties are freed from such obligation.199 Besides that, a 
contract may be determined before completion at common law or by the exercise of 
express rights set out in the contract itself. In the latter case, the determination clause 
often seeks to improve on the common law rights of the parties by giving grounds for 
determination which would not entitle one party to determine at common law. Most 
determination clauses also specify the rights and obligations of the parties following the 
exercise of the power of determination, and leave the common law rights of the parties 
intact. 200 Under common law, there are several ways to discharge the contract. There are 
discharged by frustration, discharged by repudiation and discharged by breach. 
  
                                                 
199
 Beatrix Vohrah & Wu Min Aun. [2004]. Ibid. pg 172 
200
 Powell-Smith, V and Sims, J. [1987]. Ibid. Pg 1 
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On the other hands, a contract may be discharged under the Contract Act 1950. 
There are also several ways to discharge a contract, such as discharged by performance, 
discharged by agreement, discharged by impossibility of performance and discharged by 
breach.  
 
 
In construction, there are several types of standard form of contract available in 
Malaysia, such as PWD 203A, PAM (with quantities), CIDB, IEM and etc. In each of the 
standard form of contract, there are clauses provided for the determination of contract. 
These included the determination of contract by employer and determination of contract 
by contractor. However, under the PWD 203A, there are only provided clause for the 
determination by the employer. According to the standard form of construction contract, 
there are several reasons listed down under the clauses which allow the employer or the 
contractor to determinate the contract. 
 
 
After discuss the literature and analysis of this study at the previous chapter, now 
this chapter will conclude the study and give some recommendation for future study. The 
objective of this study is to identify the most frequent disputes associated with the 
determination of contract by employer in construction projects which referred to the court.  
 
 
 
 
5.2 Research Findings 
 
 
 In this study, the author focus on the previous court cases which are related to the 
disputes associated with the determination of contract by employer which are reported 
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under the Malaysia Law Journal. 18 previous court cases are selected in this research. All 
of the cases were studied their disputes which are associated with the determination of 
contract by employer.  
 
 
 After studying all the selected cases, the author categorised the disputes 
accordingly. Under the PWD 203A and PAM 1998 standard form of contract, there are 
several defaults by the contractor which allowed the employer determinate the 
contractor’s employment. Based on those defaults which listed under the form of contract, 
the author need to categorize all the selected cases according to the disputes associated 
with the determination of contract by employer. 
 
 
 Therefore, after analysing all the disputes associated with the determination of 
contract by employer in those selected cases, the author summarize it and categorized the 
disputes of each cases accordingly. From the table in chapter four, we can found that the 
most frequent dispute which caused the determination of contract is the contractor failure 
to proceed the works regularly and diligently. There are around half of the cases which 
referred to court associated with the determination of contract by employer due to that 
default.  
 
 
 Besides the failure to proceed regularly and diligently, the most frequent dispute 
associated with the determination of contract by employer which refers to the court is the 
suspension of works by the contractor. There are around 8 selected cases caused from this 
default. More than half of the cases discussed under the suspension of works by 
contractors due to the not satisfied with the payment by the employer. The contractors 
suspend the works and claiming that they will continue the works unless the employers 
pay the contractors on time and satisfied them. Furthermore, some of the cases under the 
suspension of works are caused by the defaults of the contractors themselves. The 
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contractors cannot complete the works on time and suspends the works with unreasonable 
reason. 
 
 
 From the result of the analysis at chapter four, there are 3 cases reported under the 
Malaysia Law Journal which the contractors’ employment determined due to failure to 
remove defective works. Those cases having the similar situation where the contractor 
failed to proceed satisfied works and failed to remove the defective works instructed by 
the Superintending Officer or Architect. Under the contract, the architect is given specific 
power to instruct that defective work be remedied. Therefore, after the valid instruction 
or notice issued by the Architect, the contractor still remains the same, it can say that the 
contractor had breach of the contract. 
 
 
 On the other hands, it is surprising that there are not any related cases reported 
under the Malaysia Law Journal with are associated with the determination of 
contractor’s employment due to the contractor assignment or sub-letting their works 
without employer’s consent; failure to execute works in accordance with contract and 
also caused by bankruptcy of the contractor. For the default of contractor assignment or 
sub-letting their works without employer’s consent, the contractor is safeguarded in three 
ways: firstly, the employer’s consent cannot be ‘unreasonable withheld’; secondly, the 
contractor must have failed to comply for 14 days and; thirdly, the determination by the 
employer must not be ‘unreasonable and vexatious’. Besides that, assignment or sub-
letting in themselves would not be necessarily be causes for determining at common law. 
However, it may give rise to a claim for nominal damages201.202 Therefore, this may 
caused the default of contractor assignment or sub-letting without consent is not one of 
the frequent issues under the determination of contractors’ employment. 
 
 
                                                 
201
 See Thomas Feather & Co (Bradford) Ltd v Keighley Corporation [1953] 52 Local Government Reports 
30.  
202
 Sundra Rajoo. (1999). Ibid. Pg 251 
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 For the bankruptcy or insolvency of contractor, even in the contract provided that 
the contract may automatically determined if the contractor is in financial difficulties as 
evidenced by insolvency, but in practice, parties often carry on with their work and 
payments until the one of them by an overt act indicates that the contract is terminated. In 
general, it is unwise for the employer to reply completely on ‘automatic determination’. 
Even though Clause 25 under PAM form of contract does not specifically require it, the 
employer who intends to invoke the clause should inform the contractor, the official 
assignee liquidator of his reliance on it. This would avoid any claim by the contractor that 
the employer has waived his rights under the clause by allowing the work to continue203. 
204
 
 
 
 Besides those defaults of contractor listed under the contract may caused the 
contractors’ employment determined, there are one of the special case which reported 
under the Malaysia Law Journal showed the employer determinate the contract due to the 
economy downturn. In that case, the contractor was informed either to extend the period 
of completion of the project or to stop work and to compensate the plaintiff for the costs 
it had incurred so far. The court held that there is no specific provision in the building 
contract relating to economic downturn as a reason for an issuance of a stop work order. 
It is also not specifically stated as one of the grounds for terminating the building contract. 
The court could not infer that the parties to the building contract must have intended to 
include economic downturn as a factor that could be a basis for the repudiation of the 
building contract. Hence, the reliance on implied term principled by the first defendant as 
a justification in the issuance of the stop work order fails. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
203
 See Farley v Housing & Commercial Devlopments Ltd (1984) 26 BLR 66 ;Willment Brothers Ltd v 
North-West Thames Regional Helth Authority (1984) 26 BLR 51 
204
 Sundra Rajoo. (1999). Ibid. Pg 255 
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5.3 Future Recommendation  
 
 
After discuss for the most frequent disputes associated with determination of 
contract by employer, we can notice that this research only cover a certain area of the 
determination of contract in construction. Therefore, the author also listed several 
possible suggestions which could be carrying out for further study as follow.  
 
I. Widen the scope to all the issues arise in relating to the determination of 
contract in the construction. 
 
II. Widen the scope to more cases which related to determination of contract 
by employer and reported under other Journal besides Malaysia Law 
Journal. 
 
III. Besides that, it can compare the consequences of the determination of 
contract between the practical conditions and the provision clauses in the 
form of contract.   
 
IV. In construction contract, there are several types of standard form of 
contract. Some of the forms of contract only provide the clauses for 
determination of contract by employer. Therefore, there is a suggestion 
that the future study can focus on the determination of contract by 
contractor. How does a contractor determinate the contract in construction?  
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
 
At the end of this study, we can conclude that from the Malaysia Law Journal 
cases, the most frequent dispute associated with the determination of contract by 
employer is the failure of contractor to proceed the works on site regularly and diligently. 
Besides that, the failure of suspension of works also one of the most frequent dispute 
which caused the employer determine the contractor’s employment. Therefore, from the 
result of this study, the contractor should always maintain their progress on site and make 
sure they always proceed their works on site regularly and diligently. The contractor 
should not suspend their works without reasonable reasons. Hence, the contractor may 
avoid the employer to determine their employment. Determination of contract will 
influence the progress of works and make the relationship between the employer and 
contractor become worse.  
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